

# FOOD, FUEL, AND FACTS: DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF GLOBAL PRICE SHOCKS

Saroj Bhattarai\*

Arpita Chatterjee†

Gautham Udupa‡

January 4, 2024

We show that exogenous global commodity price shocks lead to a significant decline over time in Indian household consumption. These negative effects are heterogeneous along the income distribution: households in lower income groups experience more adverse consumption effects following an exogenous rise in food prices, whereas households in the lowest and the two highest income groups are affected similarly following an exogenous rise in oil prices. We investigate how income and relative price changes contribute to generating these heterogeneous consumption effects. Global food price shocks lead to significant negative wage income effects that mirror the pattern of negative consumption effects along the income distribution. Both global oil and food price shocks pass-through to local consumer prices in India and increase the relative prices of fuel and food respectively. Expenditure share of food increases with such a rise in relative prices, which provides unambiguous evidence for non-homothetic preferences. Specifically, we show that food, compared to fuel, is an essential consumption good for all income groups in India.

**JEL Codes:** F41, F62, O11

**Keywords:** Global Price shocks; Food prices; Oil prices; Inequality; Household heterogeneity; Household consumption; Essential consumption good; Non-homotheticity; India

---

\*Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, U.S.A. Email: [saroj.bhattarai@austin.utexas.edu](mailto:saroj.bhattarai@austin.utexas.edu).

†Department of Economics, IIM-Bangalore, India and University of New South Wales, Australia. Email: [chatterjee.econ@gmail.com](mailto:chatterjee.econ@gmail.com).

‡CAFRAL, Reserve Bank of India, India. Email: [gautham.udupa@cafral.org.in](mailto:gautham.udupa@cafral.org.in).

## Non-Technical Summary

The global economy has gone through turbulent times in the last few years. The fiscal and monetary stimulation during the pandemic, as well as the Russia-Ukraine war that followed it, has put considerable pressure on commodity prices globally. For example, the composite food price index tracked by United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization rose by 8 per cent year-on-year in August 2022, whereas the West Texas Industrial crude oil price rose 23 percent in the same month compared to a year ago. The inflation in consumer prices that accompanied the commodity price inflation was not seen in the developed economies since the global financial crisis in 2008.

From the developing economies' perspective, there have been concerns about their susceptibility to the global shocks. Different factors such as exchange rate volatility, as well as impact on household consumption due to lack of adequate savings and access to credit, have been flagged as reasons why developing economies are particularly susceptible to global commodity price inflation. In particular poorer households for whom food and fuel could be essentials with very few substitution possibilities, may face more adverse consequences. And because in emerging economies poorer households are a larger share of the population, these distributional effects may have larger aggregate demand consequences. Such adverse consequences are cited as the reason for urgent monetary policy actions to curb inflation.

This paper is the first to measure the distributional consequences of global commodity prices on household consumption in a major developing economy – India. It documents differential responses to global food and fuel price fluctuations across the rich and poorer segments of the population. A rise in global food prices leads to a fall in consumption for all households, and the effects are larger for poorer households. Effects are also economically meaningful: average food price rise of 3 per cent leads to more than 4 per cent fall in non-durable consumption for the poorest households, more than 3 per cent for the middle income groups and more than 2.5 per cent for richer households. The food inflation following the Russia-Ukraine war lead to a consumption loss of 12 per cent for the poorer households while for the middle income groups it's close to 10 per cent.

A rise in global oil prices have a more nuanced effect. Both ends of the income distribution, i.e., the poorest and the two richest income groups, are vulnerable to oil price increases. A 10 per cent inflation leads to a nearly 2 per cent fall in non-durable consumption loss for both these groups.

The paper identifies local wage earnings and local prices as the key channels through

which the global commodity price inflation impact local consumption. The pattern of effects on wage earnings mirror that of consumption: while all households show a fall in wage earnings due to rise in global food prices, the effects are monotonically larger on poorer households. The rise in oil prices erode the earnings on the poor and the rich, with no such statistically discernible effects on the middle income groups.

Global price shocks pass-through to local prices. Global food price inflation raises the food component of CPI, which in turn affects headline CPI, and makes food and its various subcomponents relatively more expensive compared to fuel. Global oil prices raise local fuel prices. It also raises core CPI especially in urban areas and both of these lead to a rise in overall CPI. The pass-through magnitudes are larger for global food inflation, but are more broad-based for global fuel inflation.

The rest of the paper documents that standard demand structures used in the business cycles literature are at odds with the estimated responses. Importantly, relative expenditure on food shows strong patterns on non-homotheticity, wherein consumption share of food are is a constant fraction of total consumption. A rise in global food prices raises relative prices of various subcomponents of food relative to fuel. Standard expenditure switching effects under demand implies a decline in relative expenditure on food. Both the overall food to fuel expenditure ratios, and particularly some sub-components such as sugar and pulses, contrary to predictions of the standard demand structure, register a rise in relative expenditure following an increase in global food prices. It suggests that these items are 'essentials' in consumption not just for the poor, but often even for the rich income groups.

# 1 Introduction

There has been a rapid increase in *global* oil and food prices recently. These large external shocks have raised major concerns worldwide, but especially so in emerging markets, whose economies tend to be more vulnerable to global shocks. For emerging markets, food and fuel price shocks affect livelihoods of a very large part of the population, which further increases their salience. Strong effects on inflation and cost-of-living are expected to hit these countries as a result of these external price increases, thereby exacerbating existing inequality.

Effects of such global price shocks driven inflation on macroeconomic outcomes and inequality have therefore been at the forefront of policy makers' agenda. For instance, in the April 2022 issue of the World Economic Outlook (WEO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) states: *Fuel and food prices have increased rapidly, with vulnerable populations—particularly in low-income countries—most affected. ... Higher food prices will hurt consumers' purchasing power—particularly among low-income households—and weigh on domestic demand.* Moreover, with deteriorating conditions in food and energy markets, the IMF's stance is more grave in the July 2022 issue of the WEO: *Rising food and energy prices cause widespread hardship, famine, and unrest. Because energy and food are essential goods with few substitutes, higher prices are particularly painful for households. When the price of other items, such as electronics, furniture, or entertainment, increases, families can simply reduce or even eliminate spending on them. For food, heating, and transportation—often essential to earn a living, this is much harder.*

Despite previous research on the impact of such global shocks, particularly oil prices, on the overall macroeconomy, there exists limited rigorous evidence on the *distributional* consequences of such shocks, especially in emerging markets. This paper seeks to address this gap by examining the causal connection between rises in global food and fuel prices and consumption inequality in India, a major emerging economy that has experienced significant inflationary pressures in these sectors recently. To this end, we begin by presenting motivating evidence that shows a positive correlation between global food and oil price fluctuations and aggregate measures of consumption inequality in India. While this correlation is intriguing and suggestive, it alone does not establish causality or demonstrate that the effects of external price shocks are sustained over time. Moreover, it cannot help identify which segments of the population are more sensitive to food and fuel price shocks, which components of consumption constitute essential consumption goods for different income groups, or elucidate the economic mechanisms through which such

global price shocks lead to consumption inequality in India.

To make headway on these questions, we utilize a comprehensive monthly household panel dataset from India that spans 2014-2019. Leveraging the panel dimension of the data, in a local projection framework at the household level, we investigate whether the dynamic effects on consumption of global oil and food price fluctuations differ along the income distribution. Our analysis involves categorizing households into five income brackets and estimating interaction effects between these groups and the global price shocks.

Furthermore, to ensure a more accurate and causal interpretation of our findings, we devise an instrumental variable (IV) strategy. Since we assume India to be a small open economy, we can regard changes in global oil and food prices as an external shock in our panel local projection exercise. However, as the literature on the macroeconomic impact of oil shocks suggests, separating out the effects of global demand (and commodity-specific demand) shocks from those of global supply shocks is essential for a clear interpretation of the results. Using changes in world oil and food prices as a measure of shock would thus produce OLS estimates that conflate the effects of both types of shocks. Moreover, global demand shocks can lead to omitted variable bias if they directly affect Indian household consumption through their exposure to the global business cycle.

To tackle this challenge, we employ an IV approach, using supply-side instruments for the change in global oil and food prices.<sup>1</sup> For the global oil price change, we use the oil supply shock estimated in [Baumeister and Hamilton \[2019\]](#) as an IV, while for the global food price change, we construct our own IV. The latter is based on residuals of food commodity prices, after extracting two common factors, a food-specific and an aggregate common factor. These factors are estimated by imposing sign restrictions in a dynamic factor model that uses panel data on commodity prices.

Our principal findings are as follows. Effects on consumption of the global price shocks are clearly adverse, and heterogeneously so, along the income distribution. Households in the lower income deciles bear a greater burden from an exogenous rise in food prices and the negative consumption effects become progressively less severe as we move up the income distribution. Exogenous rise in fuel prices, in contrast, affects consumption of both the lowest and the two higher income groups similarly.

Our IV estimates reveal substantive differences from the corresponding OLS estimates in

---

<sup>1</sup>Using an IV helps address any reverse causality concerns as well since India is growing fast and may have an impact on global demand.

some cases. For instance, there are discernible differences in the consumption responses of the highest income group when comparing the OLS and IV findings. While OLS results indicate an increase in consumption for this income group following an oil price increase, IV results exhibit a decrease instead. This finding is intuitive, as positive global demand shocks, which are a part of the OLS results, and which increase oil prices, are likely to benefit high-income households in India.<sup>2</sup>

We utilize the IV framework to further investigate the mechanisms that cause heterogeneous effects in consumption. First, we estimate heterogeneous wage earnings effects of the global price shocks. Our analysis reveals that food price shocks lead to a negative effect on real wage incomes of the poorest households. Moreover, this shock also affects non-trivially the labor earnings of other households, with the effects monotonically decreasing as we move up the income distribution. This suggests that food price shocks affect consumption heterogeneously through their differential effects on wage income. For oil price shocks, there are consistently negative labor income effects on the lowest and highest income groups, which is aligned with the negative consumption effects for these groups.

Second, state-level panel local projection IV results show that both global shocks exhibit a “pass-through” effect on local prices in India, affecting not just own-category prices but also overall (headline) prices. Both these shocks also affect relative prices: Global food price shocks elevate the relative price of food, while global oil price shocks drive up the relative price of fuel in India.<sup>3</sup>

Conventional homothetic demand functions would predict expenditure-switching effects due to such relative price effects. We, however, find strong evidence to the contrary. Specifically, we show that in response to the global food price shock, the food expenditure ratio clearly increases for the lower income groups. Given that the relative price of food increases with the global food price shock, these consumption share responses unambiguously suggest a role for income effects in relative demand. Moreover, using the responses of relative food prices, relative food expenditures, and real non-durable consumption expenditure together, we infer econometrically that food is an essential consumption good,

---

<sup>2</sup>We show direct evidence of this phenomenon by examining the effects on labor earnings. We observe positive impacts on labor income for the high-income group following an oil price increase in OLS estimates, which are absent in IV estimates. This is reminiscent of the key conclusion in [Kilian \[2009\]](#). Generally, in OLS estimates of effects of oil price shocks, we find very little negative consumption effects irrespective of the income group.

<sup>3</sup>Recognising the composite nature of the global food price index, we also go deeper in our analysis to uncover particularly pronounced relative price effects resulting from an increase in global food prices on local relative prices of pulses, sugar, oils and fats, and vegetables.

compared to fuel, for all income groups in India.<sup>4</sup>

Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. The two-way relationship between global oil prices and the U.S. macroeconomy, as well as the implications for US monetary policy, has been studied extensively in [Hamilton \[1983\]](#), [Hamilton \[2003\]](#), [Barsky and Kilian \[2004\]](#), and [Kilian \[2009\]](#). We extend this body of work by estimating the distributional effects of global oil prices, an area that has only recently garnered empirical attention (see, for example, [Gelman, Gorodnichenko, Kariv, Koustas, Shapiro, Silverman, and Tadelis \[2023\]](#), [Peersman and Wauters \[2022\]](#), and [Känzig \[2021\]](#)). Moreover, we use the oil supply shock estimated in [Baumeister and Hamilton \[2019\]](#) as an instrument in our panel IV specifications.

Although there has been some recent research on global food price shocks, such as [De Winne and Peersman \[2016\]](#) and [Peersman \[2022\]](#), this area of study is less developed than the oil shock literature. Previous studies have mainly examined the aggregate or sectoral effects of food price shocks, such as their impact on sectoral inflation. We contribute to this literature by estimating the distributional effects, at the household level, of global food prices. In our IV specification, the instrument we develop is novel as we use a statistical factor-based method with data from a broad cross-section of commodity prices to isolate food-specific and aggregate demand factors from global food price dynamics.

Our paper also contributes to two other strands of the literature that have examined the distributional effects of domestic monetary policy shocks. On the theoretical front, [Auclert \[2019\]](#) develops a general model that encompasses various redistribution based channels for monetary policy transmission. On the empirical front, [Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng, and Silvia \[2017\]](#) study the effects of US monetary policy shocks on inequality, while [Holm, Paul, and Tischbirek \[2021\]](#) estimate the heterogeneous household effects of Norwegian monetary policy shocks along the liquid asset distribution. In building on this body of work, our paper focuses on the distributional implications of an external shock in the context of an emerging market. Additionally, we use detailed household panel consumption and income data at a monthly frequency to investigate these implications and transmission mechanisms.

Our paper shares a common theme with the literature that highlights the significant impact of external shocks on emerging market economies and their role in driving busi-

---

<sup>4</sup>As we discuss later, the class of preferences that align well with our results are iso-elastic non-homothetic constant elasticity of substitution preferences between food and fuel. Our econometric analysis uses this class of preferences. See [Matsuyama \[2022\]](#) for a discussion of such preferences. We also do the econometric analysis at a disaggregated food category level and find evidence that many food categories constitute an essential consumption good.

ness cycle dynamics. For example, [Neumeyer and Perri \[2005\]](#) have emphasized the role of global interest rate shocks, while [Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe \[2011\]](#) and [Bhattarai, Chatterjee, and Park \[2020\]](#) have highlighted the importance of global volatility or uncertainty shocks. Our paper focuses on a different type of external shock, namely global food and oil price shocks, and estimates their distributional implications in India.<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, our findings regarding distributional effects on consumption imply that monetary policy in emerging markets might need to respond to such external shocks, even though they arise in sectors with flexible prices, in order to decrease consumption dispersion in the economy. The sticky price monetary policy literature highlights that optimal policy should not put any weight on inflation of flexible price sectors as they do not cause relative price distortions. In canonical open economy sticky price models, optimal monetary policy only targets domestic price inflation if import prices are determined flexibly ([\[Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2002\]](#)). Such insights do not account for effects of such shocks on consumption inequality. If such effects are present, optimal policy will need to respond to mitigate consumption disparities in the economy because with incomplete markets, consumption dispersion appears in the objective of the benevolent central bank ([\[Bhattarai, Lee, and Park, 2015\]](#) and [\[Acharya, Challe, and Dogra, 2020\]](#)).

## 2 Data, Stylized Facts, and Instrumental Variables

We now discuss our data, present some stylized facts that serve as motivation for the econometric exercise, and describe in detail our instrumental variables.

### 2.1 Data Description

Our household data is from the Consumer Pyramid Household Survey (CPHS) dataset, a survey conducted by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). CPHS has surveyed over 236,000 unique households since 2014 and is the most comprehensive longitudinal consumption data available for India. CPHS is unique in including both income data and detailed consumption data in a single longitudinal dataset. Moreover, it is available at the monthly frequency, which allows an analysis of the dynamic effects of

---

<sup>5</sup>[Lakdawala and Singh \[2019\]](#) study aggregate output and price effects in India of oil supply shocks using the [Baumeister and Hamilton \[2019\]](#) supply shocks directly as a measure of external shocks.

global food and oil prices in a straight-forward way, without having to impute data due to frequency mismatch between the shock series and the consumption/income data. The time period of our analysis is Jan 2014-Dec 2019.

We construct consumption, income, and earnings measures following closely the method of [Coibion et al. \[2017\]](#). Consumption expenditure comprises of 153 categories. Total consumption measure we construct is the sum of non-durable consumption (food, cooking fuel, electricity and transport, intoxicants), durable consumption (appliances, furniture, jewelry, clothing, electronics, toys, cosmetics), and service consumption (entertainment, beauty services, fitness services, restaurants, etc). We present results on total consumption and non-durable consumption separately in all our analysis.<sup>6</sup> We also present results on food, fuel (including cooking fuel and electricity and transport fuel), and detailed food sub-components consumption.

Total consumption is deflated using monthly state-region level Consumer Price Index (CPI) - Combined series (2012 base) available from the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (MoSPI), Government of India. The remaining consumption categories are deflated using their respective CPIs as follows. Food consumption is deflated by the index available from the MoSPI. Fuel consumption, where we include not just the cooking fuel expenditure given directly by the MoSPI but also fuel expenditure on transportation, is deflated using a weighted average of the two categories with the weights provided from the MoSPI. Non-durable consumption is deflated using a weighted average of food, cooking fuel, and transport price indices with the weights provided from the MoSPI.<sup>7</sup>

We construct income as the sum of household income from rent, wages, self-production, private transfers, government transfers, business profits, sale of assets, lotteries and gambling, pension, dividends, interest and deposit provident fund and insurance. These categories are an exhaustive list of all income sources collected in the CPHS. Our earnings measure is constructed using income from wages and overtime bonus. To construct real values of these nominal income and earnings variables we use the state-region level CPI - Combined series (2012 base). Using these data, measures of inequality we construct for stylized facts are: Gini coefficients, cross-sectional standard deviations, and differences

---

<sup>6</sup>The average share of non-durable consumption in total consumption is 75.1% in our dataset.

<sup>7</sup>We use the most detailed state and region (urban or rural) level monthly deflator available for India at a monthly frequency for our time period, following the suggestions in [Deaton \[2019\]](#). There are 35 states and union territories (regions administered by the central government) in our dataset. While headline and food CPI is available for each state-region, nondurable CPI has to be constructed. We overcome this challenge by constructing state-region (urban and rural) level non-durable CPI using state-region level headline CPI as well as state-region level food and energy consumption shares in the CPI basket. We provide further details on the data in the Appendix in Section A.

between individual percentiles (90th-10th and 75th-25th) on log levels.

Finally, we use IMF's Global Price of Food Index (Nominal, US Dollar) and the West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices (WTI, US Dollar per barrel) as our measure of global food and oil prices respectively.

## 2.2 Summary Statistics Along the Income Distribution

Several summary statistics from our household panel data, along the income distribution, are in Appendix B. Most importantly, we present in Table A1 summary statistics on average (across households and months) monthly income, monthly consumption, share of non-durable consumption, and share of food consumption by various income deciles, where the deciles are on the basis of the initial period (2014) real household income. The poorest income group is definitely below poverty line and are net borrowers with a high share of non-durable and food in consumption. Savings rate rises while non-durable and food shares decline with income. The top income decile has nearly a 75% savings rate and a relatively low share of food in total consumption.<sup>8</sup>

These statistics motivate us to divide households in five broad income groups when we estimate heterogeneous consumption effects of global commodity price shocks. In these regressions where we estimate interaction effects, we consider five income groups: very low income (decile 1), low income (deciles 2 and 3), lower middle income (deciles 4, 5 and 6), upper middle income (deciles 7, 8 and 9), and high income (decile 10). We determine the cut-offs for deciles based on real income in 2014, and assign each household to a group based on those cutoffs.<sup>9</sup>

## 2.3 Global Commodity Prices and Aggregate Inequality

We now present some stylized facts on global commodity prices and aggregate inequality in India.

---

<sup>8</sup>We also show in Table A2 that earnings constitute the most important category of income for lower income groups. For higher income groups, capital income constitute a significant fraction of total income whereas for lower income groups transfers is an important component.

<sup>9</sup>Note that the same household may belong to different income groups at different points in time depending on their current real income. This is an issue we address in the sensitivity analysis in Section 5.




Figure 1: Changes in Global Food and Fuel Prices

Notes: This figure plots the log change in IMF's Global Price of Food Index (Nominal US Dollar) and West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil Prices (US Dollar per barrel).

We first plot the log changes in global food and oil prices in Figure 1. As expected, average of the changes is close to zero while the standard deviation is approximately 2.4% for food price and nearly 8.9% for oil price, confirming a higher oil price volatility. AR(1) coefficients of the estimated processes for these change in prices are very low, indicating that the changes are largely transitory in nature. Finally, changes in the two series are positively correlated but not very highly so, hence implying independent sources of variation.<sup>10</sup>

We construct various measures of inequality and compute the conditional correlation of them with one period lagged values of global food and oil price changes. As shown in Table 1, the correlations are mostly positive. The largest positive correlations are observed between consumption inequality and the two commodity price changes. Response of consumption to global price shocks is the most relevant metric to evaluate welfare effects of such shocks. Our raw data reveals a strong correlation between aggregate consumption

<sup>10</sup>Correlation between the two series is 0.4 in our sample. Some co-movement such as this to be expected given the role of energy as input in production of food as well as the possible role of global demand in driving both commodity prices. See, for example, Peersman, Ruth, and Van der Veken [2021].

inequality and the external commodity price changes. Does this “smell test” pass an econometric examination? This is the key focus of our paper.

Table 1: Correlations of Aggregate Inequality with Global Food and Oil Price Changes

<i>Panel A: Correlations With Global Food Price Change</i>				
	Gini	SD	90th-10th	75th-25th
Income Inequality	0.108	0.097	0.153	0.063
Earnings Inequality	0.058	0.098	0.077	-0.062
<b>Consumption Inequality</b>	<b>0.234</b>	<b>0.232</b>	<b>0.215</b>	<b>0.229</b>
<i>Panel B: Correlations With WTI Crude Oil Price Change</i>				
	Gini	SD	90th-10th	75th-25th
Income Inequality	0.137	0.134	0.118	0.134
Earnings Inequality	0.047	0.098	0.090	-0.023
<b>Consumption Inequality</b>	<b>0.285</b>	<b>0.296</b>	<b>0.269</b>	<b>0.230</b>

*Notes:* This table shows correlations of one-period lag of global food and oil price changes with various inequality measures for income, earnings, and consumption that are constructed using the micro household panel data.

## 2.4 Instrumental Variables for Global Commodity Prices

In our stylized facts above we use changes in world oil and food prices (in logs) as an external shock, motivated by the small open economy assumption for India. These results can be considered as OLS versions of our estimation framework as they conflate the effects of various underlying shocks that lead to changes in world oil and food prices. As has been shown in the oil shock literature however, for a cleaner interpretation of these results, it is instructive to separate out such global oil/food price changes as coming from global demand or commodity-specific demand or global supply shocks. In addition to allowing a cleaner interpretation, isolating supply side variation also guards against omitted variable bias (OVB) problems. For instance, OVB can arise as Indian households could have *direct* exposure to the global business cycle, which is well-known to drive global commodity prices. To address this issue, we take an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach where we use supply side instruments for the change in global oil and food prices.

For the oil price change, our IV is the oil supply shock estimated in [Baumeister and Hamilton \[2019\]](#). For the food price change, we construct an IV based on residuals of global food commodity prices after extracting two common factors from a cross-section of commodity prices. We residualize the global food price index with a common factor and a food specific factor estimated using sign restrictions on a panel of 37 non-energy commodity prices (13 industrial metals and 24 food prices, available from FRED and Bloomberg in the time period 1990-2022) in a dynamic factor model. Our estimation method for this dynamic factor model is outlined in [Appendix C](#). We plot the changes in global commodity prices and their IVs, the respective supply shocks, in [Appendix D](#) in [Figure A1](#).<sup>11</sup>

### 3 Distributional Effects of Global Commodity Price Shocks

To econometrically estimate the distributional effects of global shocks in a dynamic setting, we use a household panel local projection regression framework where we estimate heterogeneous dynamic effects on consumption of global oil and food price shocks. In particular, these consumption effects will be allowed to differ along the income distribution.

---

<sup>11</sup>It is challenging to estimate a supply shock for the food sector in a way analogous to the oil supply shock due to two main reasons. Unlike oil, food is not a single commodity—it is a composite of several commodities. Also, while monthly price data is available for various components of food, monthly production data is generally not available. There are two approaches that one can take to circumvent these problems. The first is to use a large cross-section of non-energy commodity prices and a combination of statistical and theory based identification to disentangle supply and demand shocks (e.g., as in [Alquist, Bhattarai, and Coibion \[2020\]](#)) and this is the approach we take. The second is to use a limited cross-section of price and a proxy for monthly production data, as outlined in [De Winne and Peersman \[2016\]](#). However, the major crops of India are subject to various price regulations both on the supply and demand side in the domestic market due to minimum support prices for farmers and public distribution system of basis cereals for consumers. Hence, we prefer to rely on an approach that uses a broad cross-section of prices.

### 3.1 Panel Local Projection Framework

To capture such dynamic heterogeneous effects, we estimate a household level panel local projection model with interaction effects. Our estimation equation is:

$$\begin{aligned}
c_{i,t+h} - c_{i,t-1} = & \beta_{0,\text{food}}^{g,h} ext_t^{\text{food}} \times \mathbb{1}_{i \in g(t)} + \beta_{0,\text{oil}}^{g,h} ext_t^{\text{oil}} \times \mathbb{1}_{i \in g(t)} + \sum_{j=1}^J \alpha^h (c_{i,t-j} - c_{i,t-j-1}) \\
& + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_{k,\text{food}}^h ext_{t-k}^{\text{food}} + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_{k,\text{oil}}^h ext_{t-k}^{\text{oil}} + \sum_{d=0}^D \delta^h D_{t-d} + \gamma^{g,h} X_t \times \mathbb{1}_{i \in g(t)} \\
& + \delta_{c,t} + \delta_{l,t} + \delta_{e,t} + \delta_{\text{city},t} + \delta_{\text{age},t} + \mathbb{1}_{i \in s} \times \mathbb{1}_{\text{year}} + \mathbb{1}_{i \in s} \times \mathbb{1}_{\text{month}} + \epsilon_{i,t+h} \tag{3.1}
\end{aligned}$$

Here,  $c_i$  is the log of consumption for household  $i$  for various measures of consumption;  $ext^{\text{food}}$  and  $ext^{\text{oil}}$  stand for measures of the global food and oil price shocks respectively;  $\delta_{c,t}$ ,  $\delta_{l,t}$ ,  $\delta_{e,t}$ ,  $\delta_{\text{city},t}$ , and  $\delta_{\text{age},t}$  are respectively the fixed effects for household's caste, religion, education, residence in a big city, and age;  $\mathbb{1}_{i \in s} \times \mathbb{1}_{\text{year}}$  and  $\mathbb{1}_{i \in s} \times \mathbb{1}_{\text{month}}$  are a set of household  $i$ 's residence state by calendar year and residence state by calendar month fixed effects to account for state-specific trends and seasonality respectively; and  $D$  is the dummy for the Indian government's demonetization policy, which is allowed to have lagged effects up-to three lags.<sup>12</sup> For the AR and MA coefficients, we choose  $J = 3$ ,  $K = 3$ .

We estimate the above specification separately for each horizon ranging from  $h = 0$  to  $h = 12$ . In all the regressions, the observations are weighted using sampling weights provided by CMIE which takes into account the non-response factor. The standard errors are clustered at the state level.

The most important aspect of this specification is that we allow the consumption effects to differ by income of the household. That is,  $g(t)$  denotes income group of household  $i$  at time  $t$  constructed using cutoffs from 2014 real income data. The effects of external shocks are thus, allowed to vary by income groups. We consider five income groups: very low income (decile 1), low income (deciles 2 and 3), low middle income (deciles 4, 5 and 6), upper middle income (deciles 7, 8 and 9), and high income (decile 10).  $\beta_{0,\text{food}}^{g,h}$  is the coefficient of interest that captures the impact of global food price shock at time  $t$  on

<sup>12</sup>There are a total of eleven age groups defined based on the age of the household head. The youngest and the oldest groups consist of households below twenty years and above 65 years respectively. Households between these two ages, which roughly corresponds to working age, are classified in to groups of five years each. Education groups are defined similarly based on the education level of the household head. We consider three groups – below high school, high school educated but less than college educated, and college graduate and above. Summary statistics for different household characteristics are presented in Appendix B in Table A3.

households of group  $g$  at horizon  $h$ ;  $\beta_{0,oil}^{g,h}$  is similarly the estimate for the global oil price shock. We report cumulative impulse responses below.

$X$  denotes controls for aggregate world conditions: world industrial production as a proxy for aggregate demand ([Kilian, 2009]); US monetary policy stance as captured by the federal funds rate; and global financial volatility as captured by the VIX index. These aggregate global controls are interacted with household income group dummies.

As we discussed above, in addition to estimating OLS results, based on using changes in global food and oil prices as the shock measure  $ext$ , we will also estimate IV results where we instrument the changes in global food and oil prices. These IV results will isolate variation coming from global supply shocks and also guard against omitted variable bias problems, as we discussed previously.

Table A5 in Appendix E lists all the control and instrumental variables in our household panel local projection estimation.

### 3.2 Heterogeneous Consumption Effects: IV Results

For the local projection household panel exercise based on estimation of equation (3.1), where the effects on consumption are allowed to vary along the income distributions, our key IV results are in Figures 2 and 3 for food price shocks and oil price shocks respectively.<sup>13</sup> We present results for total consumption, non-durable consumption, and own-category consumption (fuel consumption for oil price shocks and food consumption for food price shocks). The results show that there are adverse effects on consumption, for both total and non-durable consumption, for both the shocks.

On heterogeneous effects along the income distribution, the two shocks show different patterns. For the food price shock, the lower income groups are hit harder and the negative effects become progressively less pronounced as we move to higher income groups. For the oil price shocks, the effects are more nuanced and more symmetric along the income distribution. For instance, both upper-middle and high-income households' consumption drops as much as the lower income groups. Taking statistical uncertainty into account, for oil price shocks, the consumption effects are more muted for the low-income and lower-middle income groups. That is, the adverse effects of oil price shocks are most precisely estimated and clearly negative for the tails of the income distribution.

---

<sup>13</sup>The first-stage F-statistics for these IV regressions are reported in Appendix E in Table A6.

## Heterogeneous Responses to Food Price Shock (IV)




Figure 2: Response of Consumption to External Food Price Shocks by Income Quintiles (IV)

Notes: Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (3.1) where external shock is log changes in global food price, which is instrumented by a global food supply shock and the dependent variable is log changes in household consumption. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68% confidence interval.

### Heterogeneous Responses to Oil Price Shock (IV)




Figure 3: Response of Consumption to External Oil Price Shocks by Income Quintiles (IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (3.1) where external shock is log changes in global oil price, which is instrumented by a global oil supply shock and the dependent variable is log changes in household consumption. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68% confidence interval.

To conclude, Figure 4 provides summary statistics of the results, using a box and whisker plot, for non-durable consumption. As we mentioned before, we observe that poorer income groups suffer a substantially larger consumption loss across all horizons following an exogenous rise in global food prices, whereas the poorest, the upper-middle, and the high income groups are equally vulnerable to an exogenous rise in oil prices. Moreover, the low income group (deciles 2 and 3) is shielded most from oil price increases but suffers most from food price increases.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup>The low income (deciles 2 and 3) group is even more vulnerable than the poorest to rising food prices possibly due to the public distribution system shielding the consumption loss of the very poor. To assess the statistical significance of the difference in effects across income groups, we show in Appendix E in Figure A2 the effects for all groups relative to the low income group. They shows that the differences are statistically significant and also go in the direction emphasized above.




Figure 4: Summary Statistics of Response of Non-durable Consumption to Food and Fuel Price Shocks by Income Quintiles (IV)

Notes: This figure is a box and whisker plot that summarizes the responses of non-durable consumption to the two external shocks that are presented in Figures 2 and 3. The line in the center of each box represents the median impulse response estimate across thirteen horizons; the top and the bottom edges of each box represent the 75<sup>th</sup> and the 25<sup>th</sup> percentiles respectively; and the lines above and below each box represent respectively the upper and lower adjacent values calculated as in Tukey et al. [1977].

Table 2: Magnitude of Real Non-durable Consumption Loss (in %)

Income Group	1 SD Price Shock		2022 External Price Shock	
	Max Impact 1 sd food shock	Max Impact 1 sd oil shock	Max Impact 2022 food shock (8% in Aug 2022)	Max Impact 2022 oil shock (26% in Aug 2022)
Lowest	-3.54	-2.01	-11.53	-5.85
Low	-3.82	-1.01	-12.43	-2.95
Lower middle	-3.10	-1.46	-10.08	-4.24
Upper middle	-2.58	-1.88	-8.41	-5.46
High	-2.22	-1.75	-7.24	-5.08

Notes: This table shows the loss in real non-durable consumption (in % terms) for the five income groups based on the estimates of elasticities presented in Figure 4. Columns (2)-(3) refer to a 1 standard deviation shock to food prices (2.4%) and oil prices (8.9%). Columns (4)-(5) refer to the August 2022 massive rise in food prices (8 %) and oil prices (26 %).

To appreciate the magnitude of consumption loss due to the external shocks and the pattern of heterogeneity along the income distribution, in Table 2, we translate the elasticity estimates presented in Figure 4 to consumption loss in % terms. The first two columns of Table 2 capture the maximum negative impact of a 1 standard deviation shock in global food and oil prices (2.4% rise in the food price index and 8.9% rise in the WTI crude oil price index, respectively, as presented earlier in Figure 1). This clearly shows the pattern of heterogeneity we have emphasized: for an exogenous food price increase, the poorest two groups clearly suffer the most in consumption loss in % terms and there is a clear pattern of monotonicity along the income distribution, while for an exogenous oil price increase, the lowest and the two highest income groups suffer similarly. Moreover, the low income group is shielded most from oil price increases but suffers most from food price increases.

To make this analysis salient for recent events, a similar pattern is observed when we evaluate the consumption loss for the massive rise in food and oil prices in 2022 in the last two columns of Table 2. In August 2022, the IMF Food Price Index was higher by 8 percent while the WTI Crude Oil Prices was higher by 26 percent, compared to a year ago. For such a large rise in external food prices, the poorest two groups suffer around 12% loss in non-durable consumption and the effect declines monotonically with income. The oil price increase leads to a smaller, but still sizeable, negative effects of around 5 % for the poorest and the two highest income groups.

## 4 Channels for Heterogeneous Consumption Effects

After establishing these baseline results on heterogeneous effects on consumption, we delve further into interpretation and possible transmission mechanisms. In particular, we aim to assess the channels that work via real income, through relative price effects (say across sectors), and those that reflect non-homotheticity in preferences.

### 4.1 Transmission Mechanisms in Theory

We start by developing a theoretical framework that will inform how we explore and test for various transmission mechanisms in the data.

### 4.1.1 Dynamic Consumption-Saving Problem

As in Auclert [2019], we consider a infinite horizon consumption-savings problem in a perfect foresight environment with unexpected shocks, where the household can trade various nominal and real assets of different maturities. The household chooses  $\left\{ C_t, \frac{B_t}{P_t}, \frac{B_{2,t}}{P_t}, E_t, L_t \right\}$  to maximize lifetime utility

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \frac{C_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{L_t^{1+\phi}}{1+\phi} \right]$$

subject to a sequence of flow budget constraints

$$C_t + Q_t b_t + Q_{2,t} b_{2,t} + S_t E_t = b_{t-1} \frac{1}{\Pi_t} + Q_t b_{2,t-1} \frac{1}{\Pi_t} + (S_t + D_t) E_{t-1} + w_t L_t + T_t, \quad (4.1)$$

where  $C_t$  is aggregate consumption,  $L_t$  is labor,  $B_t$  is holdings of one-period risk-free nominal bonds,  $B_{2,t}$  is holdings of two-period risk-free nominal bonds, and  $E_t$  is holdings of stocks.<sup>15</sup>  $Q_t$ ,  $Q_{2,t}$ , and  $S_t$  are prices of the one-period bond, the two-period bond, and the stock respectively. The stock yields dividends  $D_t$ ,  $P_t$  is the aggregate nominal price level,  $\Pi_t = \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}}$  is gross inflation,  $w_t$  is real wages, and  $T_t$  is lump-sum transfers. Thus,  $b_t = \frac{B_t}{P_t}$  is the real holdings of the one-period nominal bonds and  $b_{2,t} = \frac{B_{2,t}}{P_t}$  is the real holdings of the two-period nominal bonds. Finally,  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  is the discount factor,  $\sigma^{-1}$  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and  $\phi^{-1}$  is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.

The flow budget constraint, Equation (4.1), makes clear how shocks in period  $t$  affect consumption-savings decisions through their effects not only on labor earnings  $w_t L_t$ , but also through revaluations of financial positions by affecting inflation and asset prices  $\Pi_t$ ,  $Q_t$ , and  $S_t$ . In this perfect foresight environment, the asset pricing conditions imply equal interest rates across the various assets. Using these no-arbitrage conditions and the Transversality condition together with the flow budget constraints yields the intertemporal budget constraint

$$\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \rho_{t,t+s} C_{t+s} = \left[ \frac{1}{\Pi_t} (b_{t-1} + Q_t b_{2,t-1}) + (S_t + D_t) E_{t-1} \right] + \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \rho_{t,t+s} (w_{t+s} L_{t+s} + T_{t+s}) \quad (4.2)$$

where

$$\rho_{t,t} = 1; \rho_{t,t+s+1} = \prod_{j=0}^s R_{t+j+1}^{-1}; R_{t+j+1} = \frac{1}{Q_{t+j} \Pi_{t+j+1}}.$$

The intertemporal budget constraint, Equation (4.2), states that the present discounted

<sup>15</sup>The household also faces an appropriate no-Ponzi game constraint.

value of consumption, using time-varying interest rates for discounting, equals the present discounted value of labor income and transfers as well as the real value of payoffs from ex-ante financial positions. It also shows that unexpected shocks can affect consumption through (a) wage earnings by affecting current or future wages or labor supply; (b) discount factors by affecting current or future real interest rates; and (c) real value of payoffs on ex-ante financial holdings by affecting current inflation, short-term nominal interest rate, or stock prices. Heterogeneity in how such unexpected shocks affect wage earnings or heterogeneity in ex-ante financial positions in terms of nominal bonds, maturity of nominal bonds, and stocks in turn can then generate heterogeneity in consumption effects.

Going further, if we impose a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( $\sigma^{-1}=1$ ), since

$$\rho_{t,t+s+1} = \prod_{j=0}^s \frac{\beta C_{t+j}}{C_{t+j+1}},$$

by manipulating equation (4.2), we get the solution for current consumption as

$$C_t = (1 - \beta) \left[ \frac{1}{\Pi_t} (b_{t-1} + Q_t b_{2,t-1}) + (S_t + D_t) E_{t-1} + \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \rho_{t,t+s} (w_{t+s} L_{t+s} + T_{t+s}) \right]. \quad (4.3)$$

Equation (4.3) makes clear how the various transmission mechanisms discussed above, (a)-(c), govern the effect of unexpected shocks on current consumption. Perhaps even more importantly, it shows that heterogeneity in the response of wage income as well as heterogeneity in ex-ante positions in nominal bonds, maturity of nominal bonds, and stocks will lead to heterogeneity in consumption. Given our data, we state a key prediction that we can test below.

**Testable Prediction 1:** From Equation (4.3), heterogeneous response of wage income to the external price shocks leads to a heterogeneous response of consumption.

#### 4.1.2 Static Expenditure Allocation Problems

Given the dynamic consumption-saving problem and solution in the previous section that determines the level of aggregate consumption, we now present the static expenditure allocation problem across various consumption categories, given a level of total consumption,  $C_t$ .

$C_t$  is a standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator of non-durable con-

sumption goods and the rest of consumption goods, for example, durable and services, denoted by  $C_{N,t}$  and  $C_{S,t}$  respectively:

$$C_t = \left[ (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} C_{N,t}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} + \alpha^{\frac{1}{\eta}} C_{S,t}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}. \quad (4.4)$$

Here,  $\eta > 0$  is the elasticity of substitution and  $\alpha > 0$  governs the share of the two types of consumption goods. Standard expenditure minimization problem gives the corresponding optimal price indices and relative expenditure shares as:

$$P_t = [(1 - \alpha) P_{N,t}^{1-\eta} + \alpha P_{S,t}^{1-\eta}]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}},$$

$$\frac{P_{N,t} C_{N,t}}{P_t C_t} = (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{P_{N,t}}{P_t} \right)^{1-\eta}; \quad \frac{P_{S,t} C_{S,t}}{P_t C_t} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \left( \frac{P_{S,t}}{P_t} \right)^{1-\eta},$$

where  $P_{N,t}$  and  $P_{S,t}$  are prices of the non-durable and rest of consumption goods respectively. Hence, relative expenditure shares between non-durable and total consumption are completely governed by relative prices. In particular, expenditure share of non-durable consumption ( $M_i, i = N$ ) in total consumption is given in logs as

$$\log M_{N,t} = \log(1 - \alpha) - (\eta - 1) \log \left( \frac{P_{N,t}}{P_t} \right). \quad (4.5)$$

Given our data, we state a key prediction that we can test below.

**Testable Prediction 2:** Assuming  $\eta > 1$ , from Equation (4.5), if relative price of non-durable consumption increases in response to the external price shocks, it leads to a decrease in the expenditure share of non-durable consumption.

Next, we model non-durable consumption as an iso-elastic non-homothetic CES aggregator of food and fuel.<sup>16</sup> Hence, expenditure shares of food and fuel ( $M_i, i = F, O$  for food

<sup>16</sup>For this class of utility function, for a consumption bundle  $\mathbf{x}$ ,  $U(\mathbf{x})$  is given implicitly as:

$$\left[ \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i^{\frac{1}{\sigma_\epsilon}} U(\mathbf{x})^{\frac{\epsilon_i - \sigma_\epsilon}{\sigma_\epsilon}} x_i^{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma_\epsilon}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma_\epsilon}{\sigma_\epsilon - 1}} \equiv 1,$$

where  $\sigma_\epsilon > 0$  ensures global quasi-concavity, and  $\frac{\epsilon_i - \sigma_\epsilon}{1 - \sigma_\epsilon} > 0$  ensures global monotonicity. Given total expenditure on this bundle of consumption,  $E$ , the cost of living index ( $P$ ) is implicitly given by:

$$\left[ \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i \left( \frac{E}{P} \right)^{\epsilon_i - 1} \left( \frac{P_i}{P} \right)^{1 - \sigma_\epsilon} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \sigma_\epsilon}} \equiv 1.$$

See Matsuyama [2022] for further details and references.

and fuel respectively) in non-durable consumption are given by

$$M_{it} \equiv \frac{P_{it}C_{it}}{P_{N,t}C_{N,t}} = \gamma_i \frac{E_{Nt}^{\epsilon_i-1}}{P_{Nt}} \frac{P_{it}^{1-\sigma_\epsilon}}{P_{Nt}}, \quad (4.6)$$

where  $P_{i,t}$  are prices of the food and fuel ( $i = F, O$  for food and fuel respectively),  $E_{Nt} = P_{N,t}C_{N,t}$  is nominal expenditure on non-durable goods,  $\epsilon_i$  is the slope of the Engel curve,  $\sigma_\epsilon > 0$  is the price elasticity, and  $\gamma_i$  is the expenditure share in non-durable.

In the presence of such non-homotheticity, the expenditure shares depend on the level of real non-durable consumption. More precisely, relative expenditure shares are

$$\underbrace{\log\left(\frac{M_{it}}{M_{jt}}\right)}_{\text{Relative expenditure}} = \log\left(\frac{\gamma_i}{\gamma_j}\right) - \underbrace{(\sigma_\epsilon - 1) \log\left(\frac{P_{it}}{P_{jt}}\right)}_{\text{Relative price effect}} + \underbrace{(\epsilon_i - \epsilon_j) \log\left(\frac{E_{Nt}}{P_{Nt}}\right)}_{\text{Total expenditure effect}}. \quad (4.7)$$

In Equation (4.7) above, a good  $i$  is a necessity if and only if  $\epsilon_i < \bar{\epsilon}$  and a luxury if and only if  $\epsilon_i > \bar{\epsilon}$ , where  $\bar{\epsilon}$  is the budget-share weighted average of  $\epsilon_i$ . This means that iso-elastic non-homothetic CES can allow the same good to be luxury or necessity depending on the level of real expenditure.

As long as (overall, and various sub-components of) food is a substitute with fuel (implying an elasticity of substitution,  $\sigma_\epsilon > 1$ ), an increase in relative prices reduces relative expenditure via the standard expenditure switching effect. If real non-durable expenditure ( $\frac{E_{Nt}}{P_{Nt}}$ ) falls, the only way the relative expenditure may increase with rising relative prices is if  $\epsilon_i < \epsilon_j$ . This condition,  $\epsilon_i < \epsilon_j$ , in a two-good framework implies that consumption of good  $i$  is a necessity. Given our data, we state a key prediction that we can test below.

**Testable Prediction 3:** Assuming  $\sigma_\epsilon > 1$ , from Equation (4.7), a *sufficient* condition for a good to be essential is that relative expenditure in the good rises following a rise in relative prices and a fall in total real expenditure.

## 4.2 Empirical Evidence on Transmission Mechanisms

We now present empirical evidence on the various transmission mechanisms we developed theoretically above. In particular, our analysis here will be guided by the testable predictions we developed above.

### 4.2.1 Labor Earnings Channel

We start by assessing heterogeneous real labor earnings effects of these shocks in the household panel IV local projection framework. That is, we estimate Equation (3.1), but with real labor earnings as the dependent variable. In our theoretical framework, the intertemporal budget constraint, Equation (4.2), and the solution for consumption, Equation (4.3), have shown how heterogeneity in effects on labor income can lead to heterogeneity in effects on consumption. We had summarized this channel in Testable Prediction 1 in Section 4.1.1.

Figure 5 shows the response of labor income to oil price shocks (top panel) and food price shocks (bottom panel). It is clear that food price shocks have a significant negative effect on labor earnings through out the income distribution. Moreover, these negative earnings effects of food price shocks are monotonically decreasing along the income distribution, analogous to their negative consumption effects that we showed in Figure 2. This suggests that heterogeneity in labor income effects are one source of heterogeneity in consumption response for food price shocks. For oil price shocks, the negative effects are more limited and are significant for the poorest group initially and for the rich over time. Nevertheless, these are still consistent with the negative consumption effects of oil price shocks for these two income groups that we showed in Figure 3.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup>For oil price shocks, effects on (non-durable) consumption are also significant for the upper middle income group in Figure 3. We however do not find negative labor income effects for this group in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Response of Earnings to External Food and Fuel Price Shocks by Income Quintiles (IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (3.1) where external shock is log changes in global food price, which is instrumented by a global food supply shock, and log changes in global oil price, which is instrumented by a global oil supply shock. The dependent variable is log changes in household labor earnings. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68% confidence interval.

#### 4.2.2 Aggregate Price and Relative Price Channels

We now assess the various price channels through which external commodity price shocks can affect consumption inequality. To do so, we investigate whether external price shocks pass-through to domestic prices that Indian consumers face. We use, for various components, state-region level monthly CPI data from MoSPI as measures of domestic prices. We then estimate the dynamic responses of domestic prices, that is, how these various components of state-region level monthly CPI respond to global price shocks in a panel local projection framework.

In our theoretical framework, the intertemporal budget constraint, Equation (4.2), and the solution for consumption, Equation (4.3), have shown how aggregate inflation can affect consumption by affecting the real value of pay-offs of nominal assets and how hetero-

generity in ex-ante positions on such assets can lead to heterogeneous effects on consumption. Moreover, assessing the effects of these external shocks on relative prices is critical to understanding relative consumption responses across various categories, as given in Equation (4.5) and Equation (4.7).

In addition, while not incorporated in our modelling framework, in standard sticky-price models, if external commodity price shocks lead to aggregate inflation, then by acting like “cost-push” shocks, they can cause a recession and lead to a fall in real income and wage earnings domestically. Empirically, there is evidence for such effects. For instance, [De Winne and Peersman \[2021\]](#) have established how global food price shocks, driven by adverse weather shocks, can negatively impact real economic activity in emerging economies.

The specification for the state-region level panel local projection regression to estimate dynamic effects on regional prices (and relative prices) of the external commodity price shocks is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 p_{s,r,t+h} - p_{s,r,t-1} = & \beta_{0,u}^{h,\text{food}} ext_t^{\text{food}} \times \mathbb{1}_{r=\text{urban}} + \beta_{0,u}^{h,\text{oil}} ext_t^{\text{oil}} \times \mathbb{1}_{r=\text{urban}} + \gamma_h X_t + \sum_{d=0}^D \delta^h D_{t-d} \\
 & + \sum_{j=1}^J \alpha_j^h (p_{s,r,t-j} - p_{s,r,t-j-1}) + \sum_{k=1}^K ext_{t-k}^{\text{food}} + \sum_{k=1}^K ext_{t-k}^{\text{oil}} + \theta_s + \zeta_r + \epsilon_{s,r,t+h} \quad (4.8)
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $p_{s,r,t}$  denotes (log) prices or relative prices in period  $t$  for state  $s$  and region  $r$ ,  $h$  denotes the projection horizon,  $ext$  denotes different measures of the external commodity price shock, and  $J = 1, K = 1$  are respectively the AR and MA coefficients in the specification.

Moreover,  $D$  is the dummy for the Indian government’s demonetization policy.  $X$  denotes controls for aggregate world conditions: world industrial production as a proxy for aggregate demand (

We will present IV results where we instrument the changes in global food and oil prices by the corresponding supply shocks. These IV results will isolate variation coming from supply shocks to global food and oil prices as we discussed previously. We report cumulative impulse responses. Table A7 in Appendix E lists our control and instrumental variables.

We present results based on the IV specification.<sup>18</sup> Figure 6 shows that there is pass-

<sup>18</sup>The OLS results for comparison are in Appendix E in Figure A3. The first-stage F-statistics for these IV regressions are in Appendix E in Table A8.

through to consumer prices, both to the direct category prices (right column) as well as to overall prices (left column). Dynamic effects of global food price change on overall CPI very closely follows its effects on the food component of CPI.<sup>19</sup> Finally, global oil price shock passes through strongly to domestic energy prices (comprising of fuel, light and transportation cost) in India as well as to headline prices. These results show that increases in food prices can be expected to hurt the poor more because food features more prominently in their consumption basket.




Figure 6: Response of State Level Prices to External Oil and Food Price Shocks (IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (4.8) where external shock is log changes in global oil price in the top panel and log changes in global food price in the bottom panel. These external price changes are instrumented by global supply shocks. The dependent variable is log changes in state level prices. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68% confidence interval.

Next, to illustrate the effects of these shocks on relative prices, in Figure 7 we show the responses of three relative prices: the ratio of food price to fuel price (left column), and

<sup>19</sup>This is to be expected given that on average, food constitutes around 45 percent of the CPI index share in India.

the ratio of food or fuel price to the non-durables consumption price (right column).<sup>20</sup> As is clear, global food price shocks clearly increase the relative price of food in India while global oil price shocks increase the relative price of fuel in India. These results hold across both urban and rural India.




Figure 7: Response of State Level Relative Prices to External Oil and Food Price Shocks (IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (4.8) where external shock is log changes in global oil price in the top panel and log changes in global food price in the bottom panel. These external price changes are instrumented by global supply shocks. The dependent variable is log changes in state level relative prices. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68% confidence interval.

Finally, we look at relative price effects using more dis-aggregated food categories to investigate in more detail how the external price shocks pass-through to local Indian prices as well as to understand later the results on expenditure share effects. In Figure 8 we present results for relative price responses of various food components, as ratio to fuel prices, for the case of food price shocks. That is, Figure 8 presents in a more dis-aggregated form the results that we presented above in the second row of Figure 7. It shows that in response to an exogenous increase in global food prices, relative prices of many food categories (compared to fuel prices) increase. While the increase in relative price of food categories is broad-based, quantitatively, they appear particularly salient for certain food types, such as pulses, sugar, oil and fats, and vegetables. In addition, the increase in relative prices of food categories occurs in both rural and urban India.

<sup>20</sup>Note that the sum of food and fuel prices cover most of non-durable prices in our data.

Overall, these results confirm that external commodity price shocks have a strong impact on different components of regional inflation in India, changing both the general cost of living (for example, as captured by overall CPI) as well as relative prices (for example, as captured by food and fuel CPI ratios). This, certainly, has implications for consumer behaviour. Moreover, the effects on relative prices of both shocks suggests that relative consumption expenditures will be affected non-trivially by them.




Figure 8: Response of State Level Relative Prices to External Food Price Shocks (IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (4.8) where external shock is log changes in global food price. The external food price changes are instrumented by global supply shocks. The dependent variable is log changes in state level relative prices, the ratio of various food category CPI to fuel CPI. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68 % confidence interval.

### 4.2.3 Non-Homotheticity: Consumption Share Effects Within Non-Durables

**Responses of food to fuel expenditure ratios** We next investigate the effects on nominal consumption expenditure ratios within non-durables. Note that in Figure 7 we showed that relative food prices increase in response to global food price shocks while in Figure 2 we showed that real non-durable consumption expenditure falls in response to global food price shocks. Estimating effects on ratios of nominal consumption expenditures of food, with respect to non-durables and fuel, now allows us to assess if there are any effects that suggest non-homotheticity or if these share responses are simply consistent

with expenditure switching due to relative price movements. Our theoretical framework showed how both of these channels can be captured by Equation (4.6) and Equation (4.7). In particular, Testable Prediction 3 in Section 4.1.2 had summarized that relative expenditure on food increasing in response to the food price shock, given the relative price of food and non-durable consumption expenditure responses, would be sufficient evidence for non-homotheticity.

Figure 9 presents results for food expenditure ratios with respect to non-durable consumption expenditure (top row) and fuel expenditure (bottom row). As is clear, in response to the global food price shock, food expenditure ratio increases for the lower income groups while it decreases for the two higher income groups. Given the relative price responses in Figure 7 and the decline in real non-durable consumption in Figure 2, as pointed out in Testable Prediction 3, these consumption share responses show a role for income effects in relative demand. In particular, we infer that food is unambiguously a necessity for the lower income groups. For the richer households, the response we find could be consistent with standard expenditure switching as relative expenditure on food falls. We can however still not rule out non-homotheticity as relative expenditure rising is only a sufficient condition not a necessary one, as stated in Testable Prediction 3.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup>We will address this issue below using some structural assumptions on the elasticity parameter that governs expenditure switching.




Figure 9: Response of Food Consumption Shares to External Food Price Shocks by Income Quintiles (IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (3.1) where external shock is log changes in global food price, which is instrumented by a global food supply shock. In the top panel, the dependent variable is the ratio of household nominal food to non-durable consumption expenditures and in the bottom panel the dependent variable is the ratio of household nominal food to fuel consumption expenditures. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68% confidence interval.

**Responses of detailed food categories to fuel expenditure ratios** Given this evidence for food expenditure ratios, we next delve into expenditure ratio results for various food components. This is warranted as food expenditure is a composite of different food categories and so the average response might not be indicative of non-homotheticity for all types of food expenditures. Again, Testable Prediction 3 in Section 4.1.2 had summarized that relative expenditure on food components increasing in response to the food price shock would be a sufficient proof for non-homotheticity, as relative price of these food components increases (Figure 8) and total real non-durable consumption expenditure falls (Figure 2).

Figure 10 presents results for responses of various food components to fuel expenditure ratios. For reference, we also plot the relevant relative price response in the left column. It shows that the evidence for non-homotheticity in preferences of the poor (including the two lowest income groups) with respect to various food categories is quite clear for sugar, oil and fats, and vegetables as the expenditure ratios for these categories increase.

In addition, in these three food categories, for the rich, the expenditure ratio goes down. This might suggest expenditure switching, but as we emphasized above, it does not necessarily have to be inconsistent with non-homotheticity as expenditure ratios increasing is a sufficient condition not a necessary one.

Moreover, Figure 10 shows that the clear pattern of lack of expenditure switching by the poor (again including both the low income groups) is prominent also for other food categories, such as pulses and spices. Interestingly, for pulses and spices, the results suggest no expenditure switching even by the rich. Thus, pulses and spices are clearly an essential good for all income groups in India as the results for them satisfy the condition laid out in Testable Prediction 3 in Section 4.1.2.




Figure 10: Response of Various Food Categories Consumption Shares to External Food Price Shocks by Income Quintiles(IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (3.1) where external shock is log changes in global food price (bottom panel), which is instrumented by a global food supply shock. The dependent variable is the ratio of household nominal food categories to fuel consumption expenditures. The left column shows the responses of the relevant relative prices. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68 % confidence interval.

**Estimation of demand function parameters** We now directly estimate the key demand function parameters in Equation (4.7). In particular, we fix  $\sigma_\epsilon = 2$ , allowing for some expenditure switching when relative prices change, and then estimate  $\epsilon_i - \epsilon_j$  by matching the responses on relative expenditures and total real non-durable consumption expendi-

tures to global price shocks.

The results are in Table 3. In Panel A we use the results on global good price shocks. First, we present the estimates based on total food to fuel expenditure ratio. That is, fixing  $\sigma_\epsilon = 2$ , we use the impulse responses of the food to fuel relative price from Figure 7, the food to fuel expenditure ratio from Figure 9, and real non-durable consumption expenditure from Figure 2, to estimate  $\epsilon_i - \epsilon_j$  in Equation (4.7). As is clear,  $\epsilon_i - \epsilon_j$  is estimated to be negative, showing that food is an essential good for all income groups. Next, we repeat the same exercise for various food components, using the appropriate food components to fuel relative prices and relative expenditure shares. It shows that various food components are an essential good for all income groups as  $\epsilon_i - \epsilon_j$  is negative.

Some of the  $\epsilon_i - \epsilon_j$  in Panel A are not estimated very precisely. One reason for this is that in each estimation exercise, we are only relying on 13 observations (the horizon of the impulse responses). In Panel B, we report estimates if we repeat the same exercise as in Panel A, but now use the impulse responses for both the global food and oil price shocks. As is clear, then  $\epsilon_i - \epsilon_j$  are estimated more precisely to be negative.

Table 3: Estimates of Demand Function Parameters ( $\epsilon_i - \epsilon_j$ )

	Lowest	Low	Low-middle	Upper-middle	High
<i>Panel A: Estimated Using IRFs From Only Food Shocks</i>					
Food (All)	-0.524** (0.156)	-0.613** (0.186)	-0.640** (0.184)	-0.852** (0.212)	-0.917** (0.224)
Sugar	-2.422*** (0.257)	-2.656*** (0.223)	-2.702*** (0.297)	-3.112*** (0.477)	-3.271*** (0.440)
Oils and Fats	-0.595** (0.146)	-0.801*** (0.158)	-0.581** (0.135)	-0.640** (0.153)	-0.702** (0.165)
Vegetables	-0.648 (0.520)	-1.109 (0.544)	-0.995 (0.579)	-1.585* (0.689)	-1.613 (0.780)
Pulses	-0.232 (0.317)	-0.595 (0.431)	-0.357 (0.414)	-0.414 (0.498)	-0.555 (0.544)
Spices	-0.096 (0.148)	-0.333 (0.219)	-0.382 (0.177)	-0.569* (0.222)	-0.871** (0.248)
<i>Panel B: Estimated Using IRFs From Food and Oil Shocks</i>					
Food (All)	-0.548*** (0.106)	-0.654*** (0.091)	-0.674*** (0.123)	-0.807*** (0.156)	-0.770*** (0.168)
Sugar	-1.928*** (0.170)	-2.069*** (0.102)	-2.080*** (0.180)	-2.287*** (0.270)	-2.252*** (0.288)
Oils and Fats	-0.726*** (0.097)	-0.896*** (0.071)	-0.605*** (0.070)	-0.484*** (0.097)	-0.417* (0.166)
Vegetables	-0.806** (0.272)	-1.207*** (0.209)	-1.184*** (0.308)	-1.576*** (0.408)	-1.524** (0.481)
Pulses	-0.852** (0.235)	-1.391*** (0.218)	-1.015*** (0.257)	-1.116** (0.327)	-1.156** (0.385)
Spices	-0.129 (0.095)	-0.566*** (0.123)	-0.398*** (0.103)	-0.721*** (0.185)	-0.958*** (0.227)

*Notes:* This Table reports the estimates of  $\epsilon_i - \epsilon_j$  obtained by estimating Equation (4.7) in a regression framework after fixing  $\sigma_\epsilon = 2$  and using as data the impulse responses of relative prices, relative expenditures, and real non-durable consumption expenditure. Each row represents estimates from a separate regression, with 13 observations used in Panel A and 26 observations used in Panel B. The columns represent the various income groups.  $\epsilon_i - \epsilon_j < 0$  indicates that good  $i$  (food and various food categories here) is an essential consumption good.

## 5 Discussion, Sensitivity Analyses, and Extensions

In this section, we discuss some features of the empirical results that we have presented so far that demand further attention and context. We also discuss some key sensitivity analyses to show that our key conclusions regarding heterogeneous consumption impact of global price shocks is robust. Finally, we discuss some extensions that provide complementary evidence.

### 5.1 OLS Results on Consumption and Income




Figure 11: Response of Consumption and Earnings to External Oil Price Shocks

Notes: Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (3.1) where external shock is log changes in global oil price. In the IV version, the log changes in global oil price is instrumented by a global supply shock. The dependent variable is log changes in household consumption, non-durable consumption, and labor earnings. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68% confidence interval.

As we discussed before, our IV estimates isolate global supply side variation in global commodity prices, which is important in order to both avoid mixing in the effects of supply and global demand shocks as well as guarding against omitted variable bias problems. We now further show the importance of the IV estimates by presenting the OLS results for oil price shocks. Based on household data and estimation of equation (3.1), Figure 11 present the OLS results to a key question of the paper: How does the dynamic response of consumption and income to global oil price shocks vary by ex-ante income quintiles? We show results for total and non-durable consumption as well as wage income. For comparison, we also plot the IV results we presented earlier.

As is clear, in the OLS results, as predicted, the consumption effects are not consistently and persistently negative for any income group. Moreover, the earnings effects are even positive for the higher income groups. Thus, as expected, richer Indian households benefit with relatively higher income/earnings if higher oil prices are caused by an increase in global demand, which in turn affects the Indian economy positively. Thus, it is imperative to isolate demand and supply side variation while studying distributional consequences of global price shocks.<sup>22</sup>

## 5.2 Expenditure Switching: Non-Durable Consumption Share Effects

We investigate the effects on nominal consumption expenditure ratio of non-durable to total consumption to show that expenditure switching is a reasonable model assumption. In Figure A5 we show that global food price shocks increase the relative price of non-durables while global oil price shocks, after a delay, decrease the relative price of non-durables. Estimating effects on ratios of nominal consumption expenditures on non-durables to total consumption now allows us to assess if these share responses are consistent with expenditure switching due to relative price movements, as suggested by the theoretical framework in equation (4.5) and given in Testable Prediction 2 in Section 4.1.2

Thus, in the household panel IV local projection framework we estimate equation (3.1), but with the nominal expenditure share of non-durable consumption to total consumption as the dependent variable. Figure A5 presents results for the response of non-durable to total consumption expenditure ratio for both external price shocks. The results show

---

<sup>22</sup>As Kilian [2009] originally noted for aggregate effects, here, for distributional effects too, not all oil shocks are alike! Similar, albeit not statistically significant, differences between OLS and IV results are observed in the case of food price changes in Figure A4.

that consistent with expenditure switching that comes about due to relative price changes, this ratio increases for the global oil shock, while it decreases for the global food shock.<sup>23</sup> In addition, response of the non-durable consumption shares are very similar across various income groups, suggesting that relative price movements are the main determinant, as appropriately captured by a homothetic CES aggregator in equation (4.5).

### 5.3 Discussion

We start by discussing some aspects of our results that need further elaboration and also put them in context with related literature. First, in Figure A6 we compute summary statistics to compare earnings and non-durable consumption responses from Figures 2, 3, and 5. For all income groups other than the poorest, effects on consumption are larger in magnitude than that on labor earnings. What can explain such a large consumption response? From the point of view of the theoretical model presented in Section 4.1.1, and in particular, the solution for consumption in equation (4.3), a relatively larger response of consumption (compared to the present discounted value of labor earnings using a constant discount factor) may arise either due to time-varying interest rates and wealth effects or due to asset price changes that alter the real value of payoffs from ex-ante asset positions. We, in fact, do find evidence of such effects in Indian macro data, as presented in Figure A7. A rise in global food and oil prices, instrumented by corresponding supply shocks in an aggregate time series local projection framework, leads to a rise in India's short term interest rate spread (compared to the U.S. benchmark) and lowers stock prices. Such an effect on interest rates is further confirmed using detailed annual bank-branch level (weighted) average lending rate data in a panel regression in Table A9.<sup>24</sup>

We also note that our results showing a strong response of consumption to these shocks (even non-durable consumption), compared to wage income, connect to the unconditional stylized facts from the emerging market business cycle literature. For instance, for a large sample of countries, Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe [2017] documents that consumption growth is clearly more volatile than income growth for emerging market economies and that consumption-smoothing in this sense appears to be limited. Using Indian annual data (1965-2010), Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe [2017] finds that relative volatility of consumption is higher than income (relative volatility  $\frac{\sigma_c}{\sigma_y}$ : 1.07) in India, while we reach the

<sup>23</sup>The results for the food price shock are comparatively noisier towards the end of the impulse response horizon.

<sup>24</sup>Data source of the detailed interest rate data is Basic Statistical Return of Reserve Bank of India, 1998-2016.

same conclusion using first-differenced (relative volatility  $\frac{\sigma_c}{\sigma_y}$ : 1.94) or HP filtered (relative volatility  $\frac{\sigma_c}{\sigma_y}$ : 1.35) quarterly national income accounts data (1996:Q2 to 2019:Q4).

Another important insight emerges from Figure A6 while comparing the effects on earnings with the effects on non-durable consumption for food price shocks. Earnings effects of the exogenous rise in food price are clearly much larger for the poorest than for the poor (Figure 5), but non-durable consumption effects are comparable (Figure 4). This suggests a role for the public distribution system as an insurance mechanism for those below the poverty line.

Second, as seen in Figure 5, what might be an economic mechanism at work that gives a clear role for the earnings channel for food price shocks? This can be rationalized based on the fact that most of the poorest work in the informal sector in India, as documented in Table A10, where there is no inflation adjustment in nominal wage income.<sup>25</sup> In other words, inflation is very likely to outstrip nominal wage growth for the poor. With a rise in oil prices and its broad-based price impact, there is more likely an immediate impact on the cost of living of the middle class, a large fraction of whom work in the more organized, formal sector. Consequently, there is a nominal wage adjustment of the middle class which then percolates to the nominal income of the poor.<sup>26</sup> However, with a rise in global food price and its direct effect on domestic food prices, cost of living of the poor rises disproportionately due to the higher share of food in the consumption basket of the poor.<sup>27</sup> This however, does not set off the same nominal wage adjustment process in the informal sector and as a result, we observe a decline in the real earnings of the poor.

Third, in a summary statistics format, in Figure A8 we compare the non-durable and total consumption responses to global food and oil price shocks from the IV panel results presented in Figures 2 and 3. Remarkably, the elasticity of total consumption is uniformly larger than that of non-durable consumption, pointing towards larger response of durable consumption to external price shocks.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup>Note that the classification of formal and informal occupations for CMIE data is from IIM Bangalore doctoral student Shweta Shogani's ongoing PhD thesis work. We are extremely grateful to her for sharing this classification.

<sup>26</sup>We do observe a initial decline in the real earnings of the poor immediately after the oil supply shock as well.

<sup>27</sup>Summary statistics for these various income groups, including share of food consumption, are presented in Appendix B, which show this pattern.

<sup>28</sup>Note that total consumption includes non-durable, durable, and service consumption. The excess volatility of durable consumption is a well-known empirical fact in other contexts (see, for example, Alvarez-Parra, Brandao-Marques, and Toledo [2013]) and can be rationalized in canonical models of consumption smoothing.

## 5.4 Sensitivity Analyses

The answer to our key research question: does household consumption response in India to global price shocks differ by income levels, is a clear yes. Moreover, different global shocks lead to different patterns of consumption heterogeneity: global food prices have a monotonically larger impact on poorer segments of the population, whereas global oil prices affect most clearly the lowest and the highest income groups.

Naturally, our answer may be sensitive to how we assign individuals to different income groups. In our baseline results summarized in Figure 4, households are grouped according to cut-offs based on total household real income in the initial period, 2014. Moreover, while the definition of the groups is on the basis of the initial income distribution, depending on current income, households can and do transition to a different income group over time. In this section, we report two important sensitivity analyses of our baseline results where we change the definition of income groups.

In the first exercise, instead of total household real income, we group households according to *per capita* household real income in the initial period. Because average household sizes differ by income groups, per capita household income may more accurately capture the resources available to household members, as argued in Deaton [2019]. Indeed, characteristics of households by per capita income deciles, as reflected in Table A11, are somewhat different from those reported in our baseline summary statistics in Table A1. In order to account for this, we group households into five income groups according to per capita income deciles and estimate the heterogeneous consumption responses according to equation (3.1). Summary statistics of non-durable consumption response, estimated using panel IV regressions, are in Figure A9. The results in Figure A9 reflect the same pattern of heterogeneous consumption response as in Figure 4.

In the second exercise, we retain the grouping according to total household real income in the initial period, but we restrict the transition matrix. The baseline transition matrix across income groups is presented in Table A12. While more than 80% of households remain in the same income group over time (as captured by the diagonal entries of Table A12), there are some households who transition from the highest to lowest income groups. Such a transition can potentially reflect measurement error. In order to restrict such unusual movements, we estimate the baseline panel IV local projection framework of equation 3.1 while restricting the transition matrix such that no household is allowed to move more than two (absolute) steps in the transition matrix. The resulting summary statistics of non-durable consumer response is in Figure A10. These results again are

similar in nature to the baseline results of Figure 4.

Thus, alternate definitions of income groups leave our key conclusions regarding heterogeneous household consumption response to global price shocks unchanged. While everyone suffers consumption losses due to rising food prices, poorer income groups are far more vulnerable to such food price shocks. In contrast, the lowest and highest income groups suffer equally from an increase in global oil prices.

## 5.5 Extensions

In this section, motivated by the vast regional heterogeneity of India, we conduct two extensions of our baseline empirical framework.

In the first exercise, in our baseline household regression as given in equation (3.1), we allow the impact of global price shocks to differ not just by income groups, but also by the location (rural or urban) of the household. We may reasonably expect these responses to differ by location because, among other stark differences, households who work in agriculture primarily reside in rural areas and may be differentially impacted by food price shocks. Our extended specification is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
c_{i,t+h} - c_{i,t-1} &= \beta_{0,\text{food}}^{g,h,r} \text{ext}_t^{\text{food}} \times \mathbb{1}_{i \in g(t)} \times \mathbb{1}_{i \in \text{urban}} + \beta_{0,\text{oil}}^{g,h,r} \text{ext}_t^{\text{oil}} \times \mathbb{1}_{i \in g(t)} \times \mathbb{1}_{i \in \text{urban}} \\
&+ \sum_{j=1}^J \alpha^h (c_{i,t-j} - c_{i,t-j-1}) + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_{k,\text{food}}^h \text{ext}_{t-k}^{\text{food}} + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_{k,\text{oil}}^h \text{ext}_{t-k}^{\text{oil}} + \sum_{d=0}^D \delta^h D_{t-d} \\
&+ \gamma^{g,h} X_t \times \mathbb{1}_{i \in g(t)} + \delta_{c,t} + \delta_{l,t} + \delta_{e,t} + \delta_{\text{city},t} + \delta_{\text{age},t} + \mathbb{1}_{i \in \text{s}} \times \mathbb{1}_{\text{year}} + \mathbb{1}_{i \in \text{s}} \times \mathbb{1}_{\text{month}} + \epsilon_{i,t+h}
\end{aligned} \tag{5.1}$$

where  $\mathbb{1}_{i \in \text{urban}}$  captures whether household  $i$  resides in an urban area,  $r = \text{rural, urban}$ .

Results for consumption responses are presented in Figures A11 and A12, and the corresponding earnings results are in Figure A13. Low income groups in rural areas seem to be suffer a larger (compared to their urban counterparts) non-durable consumption loss due to a global food price shock, while the high income households in rural areas suffer a larger (again, compared to their urban counterparts) consumption loss due to a global oil price shock. On the earnings side, the sharp drop in earnings for the low income households due to an increase in global food prices seems to be driven by urban households. Apart from these differences, the broad pattern of responses are largely similar across urban and rural India.

In the second exercise, we assess the effects on regional inequality of the global commodity price shocks, which we make operational by constructing several measures of regional inequality. The specification for the state-level panel local projection regression to estimate dynamic effects on regional consumption inequality of the external commodity price shocks is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Cineq_{s,t+h} - Cineq_{s,t-1} = & c + \sum_{j=1}^J \alpha_j^h (Cineq_{s,t-j} - Cineq_{s,t-j-1}) + \sum_{k=0}^K \beta_k^h ext_{t-k} \\
 & + \sum_{d=0}^D \delta^h D_{t-d} + \gamma_h X_t + \theta_s + \delta_t + \epsilon_{s,t+h}
 \end{aligned} \tag{5.2}$$

where  $Cineq_{s,t}$  denotes various measures of state-level inequality (in log) for total consumption and non durable consumption in period  $t$ ,  $h$  denotes the projection horizon,  $ext$  denotes different measures of the external commodity price shock, and  $J = 1, K = 1$  are respectively the AR and MA coefficients in the specification. Finally, our specification includes state and time fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. This specification is similar to the state price regression specification outlined in equation (4.8).

Figure A14 presents the IV results for the food price shock. It shows that consumption inequality increases robustly following an exogenous change in global food prices. Figure A15 presents the IV results for the oil price shock. It shows that an increase in global oil prices does not have as clear of an effect on consumption inequality as does global food prices, suggesting that traditional inequality measures might not capture the subtle ways in which household get differentially affected along the income distribution by exogenous oil price shocks.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper, we explore the distributional implications of the increasing global food and oil prices by utilizing rich consumption and income panel data from India. Our results show robust evidence that lower income deciles are more affected by an exogenous increase in food prices, while both tails of the income distribution are affected similarly by an exogenous increase in fuel prices. We also find that these heterogeneous consumption responses largely mirror the pattern of heterogeneity in earnings response to these global price shocks.

Examining relative expenditure responses, in light of relative price effects, allows us to uncover very interesting patterns of non-homotheticity in non-durable consumption. We find food, compared to fuel, is an essential consumption good for all income groups in India. Our analysis provides a novel way of identifying essential consumption components by relying on a non-homothetic isoelastic CES demand structure and impulse response matching using external instruments.

Our findings have significant implications for monetary policy. The substantial distributional effects on consumption that we have documented suggest that in emerging markets, monetary policy may need to react to external shocks in the food and oil sectors, despite the flexibility of prices in these sectors. This response would be advantageous in terms of reducing consumption inequality in the economy. In our future research, we intend to further investigate this matter by studying optimal monetary policy in a heterogeneous agent open economy model.

## References

- Sushant Acharya, Edouard Challe, and Keshav Dogra. Optimal monetary policy according to hank. 2020.
- Ron Alquist, Saroj Bhattarai, and Olivier Coibion. Commodity-price comovement and global economic activity. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 112:41–56, 2020.
- Fernando Alvarez-Parra, Luis Brandao-Marques, and Manuel Toledo. Durable goods, financial frictions, and business cycles in emerging economies. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 60(6):720–736, 2013.
- Adrien Auclert. Monetary policy and the redistribution channel. *American Economic Review*, 109(6):2333–67, June 2019. doi: 10.1257/aer.20160137. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20160137>.
- Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian. Oil and the macroeconomy since the 1970s. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(4):115–134, 2004. URL <https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v18y2004i4p115-134.html>.
- Christiane Baumeister and James D. Hamilton. Structural interpretation of vector autoregressions with incomplete identification: Revisiting the role of oil supply and demand shocks. *American Economic Review*, 109(5):1873–1910, 2019. doi: 10.1257/aer.20151569. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20151569>.
- Saroj Bhattarai, Jae Won Lee, and Woong Yong Park. Optimal monetary policy in a currency union with interest rate spreads. *Journal of International Economics*, 96(2):375–397, 2015. URL <https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:inecon:v:96:y:2015:i:2:p:375-397>.
- Saroj Bhattarai, Arpita Chatterjee, and Woong Yong Park. Global spillover effects of US uncertainty. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 114(C):71–89, 2020. doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.05. URL <https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v114y2020icp71-89.html>.
- Arpita Chatterjee. Globalization and monetary policy comovement: International evidence. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 68:181–202, 2016.
- Richard Clarida, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler. A simple framework for international monetary policy analysis. *Journal of monetary economics*, 49(5):879–904, 2002.
- Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Lorenz Kueng, and John Silvia. Innocent bystanders? Monetary policy and inequality. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 88(C):70–89,

2017. doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2017.05. URL <https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v88y2017icp70-89.html>.

Jasmien De Winne and Gert Peersman. Macroeconomic effects of disruptions in global food commodity markets: Evidence for the United States. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 47(Fall):183–286, 2016.

Jasmien De Winne and Gert Peersman. The adverse consequences of global harvest and weather disruptions on economic activity. *Nature Climate Change*, 11(8):665–672, 2021.

Angus Deaton. *The analysis of household surveys (reissue edition with a new preface): A microeconomic approach to development policy*. World Bank Publications, 2019.

Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, Pablo Guerron-Quintana, Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez, and Martin Uribe. Risk matters: The real effects of volatility shocks. *American Economic Review*, 101(6):2530–61, 2011. doi: 10.1257/aer.101.6.2530. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.6.2530>.

Michael Gelman, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Shachar Kariv, Dmitri Koustas, Matthew D Shapiro, Dan Silverman, and Steven Tadelis. The response of consumer spending to changes in gasoline prices. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 15(2):129–160, 2023.

James D Hamilton. Oil and the macroeconomy since World War II. *Journal of Political Economy*, 91(2):228–248, 1983. doi: 10.1086/261140. URL <https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v91y1983i2p228-48.html>.

James D. Hamilton. What is an oil shock? *Journal of Econometrics*, 113(2):363–398, 2003. URL <https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/econom/v113y2003i2p363-398.html>.

Martin Blomhoff Holm, Pascal Paul, and Andreas Tischbirek. The transmission of monetary policy under the microscope. *Journal of Political Economy*, 129(10):2861–2904, 2021. doi: 10.1086/715416. URL <https://doi.org/10.1086/715416>.

Diego R Känzig. The unequal economic consequences of carbon pricing. *Available at SSRN 3786030*, 2021.

Lutz Kilian. Not all oil price shocks are alike: Disentangling demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market. *American Economic Review*, 99(3):1053–1069, 2009. URL <https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v99y2009i3p1053-69.html>.

M Ayhan Kose, Christopher Otrok, and Charles H Whiteman. Understanding the evolution of world business cycles. *Journal of international Economics*, 75(1):110–130, 2008.

- Aeimit Lakdawala and Sanjay Singh. The effects of foreign shocks in the indian economy. *India Policy Forum*, 6, 2019.
- Kiminori Matsuyama. Non-ces aggregators: a guided tour. *Buffett Institute Global Poverty Research Lab Working Paper Forthcoming*, 2022.
- Pablo A. Neumeyer and Fabrizio Perri. Business cycles in emerging economies: The role of interest rates. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 52(2):345–380, 2005. URL <https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v52y2005i2p345-380.html>.
- Gert Peersman. International food commodity prices and missing (dis)inflation in the Euro Area. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 104(1):85–100, 01 2022. ISSN 0034-6535. doi: 10.1162/rest\_a\_00939. URL [https://doi.org/10.1162/rest\\_a\\_00939](https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00939).
- Gert Peersman and Joris Wauters. Heterogeneous household responses to energy price shocks. 2022.
- Gert Peersman, Sebastian K R uth, and Wouter Van der Veken. The interplay between oil and food commodity prices: has it changed over time? *Journal of International Economics*, 133:103540, 2021.
- John W Tukey et al. *Exploratory data analysis*, volume 2. Reading, MA, 1977.
- Martin Uribe and Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe. *Open Economy Macroeconomics*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2017.

## Appendix A Data Description

### *Survey Data*

We use data from the Consumer Pyramid Household Survey (CPHS) dataset, a survey conducted by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). The CPHS has surveyed over 236,000 unique households since it began in 2014, and is the most comprehensive longitudinal consumption data available for India. The CPHS is itself divided into 4 distinct datasets: Consumption Pyramids, Income Pyramids, People of India Survey and Aspirational India survey. We use the data from the Consumption and Income Pyramid surveys to construct our variables, and data from the People of India survey for our control variables about demographics. Our analysis spans data from January 2014 to December 2019.

### *Level variables*

We construct income, earnings, and consumption categories closely following the definitions given by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2017). We first construct income as the sum of household income from rent, wages, self-production, private transfers, government transfers, business profits, sale of assets, lotteries and gambling, pension, dividends, interest and deposit provident fund and insurance. These categories are an exhaustive list of all income sources collected in the CPHS survey.

Additionally, we construct narrow and broad measures of capital income. The narrow measure of capital income includes income accrued from dividends, interest and business, whereas the broad measure includes the income sources from the narrow measure as well as income accrued from sale of assets and rent.

Our (labor) earnings measure is constructed using only the category of income from wages and overtime bonus.

We construct consumption closely matching the categories constructed by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2017). The consumption variable we construct is the sum of non-durable consumption (food, fuel, intoxicants), durable consumption (appliances, furniture, jewelry, clothing, electronics, toys, cosmetics), and service consumption (electricity, entertainment, public transport, airfare, highway tolls, beauty services, fitness services, restaurants etc). We then deflate all our income and earnings measures by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) - Combined series (2012 base). We also winsorize our constructed variables at the 1 percent level.

### *Inequality variables*

The measures of inequality we construct using these variables are: Gini coefficients, cross-sectional standard deviations and differences between individual percentiles (90th-10th and 75th-25th) on log levels.

### *External shock measure*

We use IMF's Global Price of Food Index (Nominal USD) and WTI crude oil prices (USD) at monthly frequency as our data for global food and oil prices. We construct shocks by taking differences of the logs of both food and oil prices.

### *Data on Prices*

The Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), Government of India, releases detailed data on prices at the monthly frequency. The series has 2012 as the base year and data is available from January 2011. The data is dis-aggregated by geography as well as by products. Geographically, data is available by urban and rural areas within each state. There is some missing data at the state-geography level, but it is not a major concern (97% of India's consumption is covered in the state-geography data).

On the product side, aggregate CPI is broken down into six broad sub-classifications (national level weights are in parenthesis): i) food and beverages (45.86%); ii) pan, tobacco, and intoxicants (2.38%); iii) clothing and footwear (6.53%); iv) housing (10.07%); v) fuel and light (6.84%); and vi) miscellaneous (28.32%). The coverage (in terms of sub-products) varies across the sub-classifications. The most detailed data is available only for food categories. It comprises of i) cereals and products; ii) meat and fish; iii) egg; iv) milk and milk products; v) oils and fats; vi) fruits; vii) vegetables; viii) pulses and products; ix) sugar and confectionery; x) spices; xi) non-alcoholic beverages; and xii) prepared meals, snacks, sweets, etc.

We construct price indexes for fuel and non-durables. Although the MoSPI provides an index for fuel, it only includes fuel used for cooking and excludes the fuel used in transportation; the index for transportation is available under the "miscellaneous (transportation and communication)" category. While this category has several missing values at the state-geography level, the missing values are concentrated among smaller states (such as Andaman and Nicobar islands) that contribute to under 3% of India's consumption. We use the state-geography level weights of fuel and light (FL) and miscellaneous (trans-

portation and communication, or TC) categories to construct a new composite index:

$$CPI(FL + TC)_{sgt} = \frac{W(FL)_{sg}CPI(FL)_{sgt} + W(TC)_{sg}CPI(TC)_{sgt}}{W(FL)_{sg} + W(TC)_{sg}}$$

where subscript  $s$  represents state,  $g \in \{Urban, Rural\}$  represents geography, and  $t$  represents month. This provides a closer measure of energy consumption.

The non-durable price index includes food and the composite fuel prices. It is calculated as

$$CPI(NonDur.)_{sgt} = \frac{W(Food)_{sg}CPI(Food)_{sgt} + W(FL)_{sg}CPI(FL)_{sgt} + W(TC)_{sg}CPI(TC)_{sgt} + W(Pan)_{sg}CPI(Pan)_{sgt}}{W(Food)_{sg} + W(FL)_{sg} + W(TC)_{sg} + W(Pan)_{sg}}$$

## Appendix B Summary Statistics by Income

Table A1: Summary Statistics by Income Decile

	No. of Hhs	Income	Consumption	Non-durable Share	Food Share
1st Decile	43,210.66	476.65	1,221.19	0.78	0.62
2nd Decile	8,034.27	4,365.17	4,168.35	0.78	0.64
3rd Decile	10,832.47	5,579.25	4,708.03	0.77	0.63
4th Decile	12,049.10	6,720.92	5,190.72	0.77	0.61
5th Decile	12,673.92	7,972.92	5,669.16	0.76	0.60
6th Decile	14,400.27	9,613.48	6,093.47	0.76	0.59
7th Decile	15,089.84	11,736.90	6,655.97	0.75	0.58
8th Decile	15,101.95	14,850.60	7,345.38	0.74	0.56
9th Decile	15,345.27	20,166.59	8,302.80	0.73	0.55
10th Decile	19,239.84	37,353.66	10,447.05	0.72	0.51

*Notes:* This table presents some summary statistics by income deciles. Income and consumption are in real terms where they are deflated by the CPI (all, 2012=100). Non-durable and food share refer to consumption shares of non-durable and food consumption.

Table A2: Income Composition by Income Groups

Income Group	Earnings	Transfers	Capital Income (Broad)	Pensions
Lowest	.63	.16	.03	.03
Low	.88	.04	.05	.02
Lower middle	.84	.02	.09	.04
Upper middle	.75	.02	.15	.08
High	.67	.01	.21	.10

*Notes:* This table presents some summary statistics by income groups, where it shows shares of various sources of income.

Table A3: Socio-Economic Variables by Income Quintiles

	Q <sub>1</sub>	Q <sub>2</sub>	Q <sub>3</sub>	Q <sub>4</sub>	Q <sub>5</sub>
Quintile Shares (%)					
<i>Panel A: Religion</i>					
Buddhist	26	13	16	20	25
Christian	30	10	14	20	26
Hindu	30	14	16	18	21
Jain	21	4	10	17	47
Khasi	32	5	6	20	36
Muslim	30	16	19	19	15
Not Applicable	25	1	5	8	62
Other Religion	33	11	14	17	25
Religion not stated	50	9	9	11	20
Sikh	24	7	12	19	38
<i>Panel B: Caste Category</i>					
Intermediate Caste	32	10	14	17	27
Not Applicable	25	1	5	8	62
Not Stated	35	7	11	18	29
OBC	30	15	18	19	18
SC	29	19	19	19	14
ST	41	17	16	14	12
Upper Caste	27	10	14	19	31
<i>Panel C: Education Category</i>					
Upto 7th Std	34	18	19	18	12
Upto 12th Std	28	13	17	20	22
≥ College Graduate	24	5	9	17	44
<i>Panel D: Region</i>					
Urban	25	13	17	20	25
Rural	39	16	16	15	13

*Notes:* This table presents summary statistics on some socio-economic variables by income deciles.

## Appendix C Estimation of the Food Price Shock IV

Table A4: Non-energy Prices used in estimating the Dynamic Factor Model

Food	Food	Industrial Metals
Rice	Wheat	Iron ore
Bananas	Barley	Aluminium
Beef	Cocoa	Copper
Coffee Arabica	Coffee Robust	Cotton
Fishmeal	Corn	Lead
Poultry	Fish	Soft logs
Shrimp	Sugar	Hard logs
Orange	Tobacco	Nickel
Tea	Olive Oil	Rubber
Palm Oil	Rapeseed Oil	Tin
Soybean Oil	Sunflower Oil	Wool coarse
Groundnut oil	Coconut oil	Wool fine
		Zinc

*Notes:* Commodity prices data are collected from FRED and Bloomberg and are quoted in US Dollar per unit. The units differ by commodity, but in the estimation we only use the log difference in price levels, i.e., returns.

In order to estimate the food shock, we first estimate a dynamic factor model with one common factor and two sector specific factors in a panel of 37 non-energy commodity prices (see, Table A4) which comprise of 13 industrial metals and 24 food prices. The dynamic factor model can be described as:

$$r_{i,t} = B^i f_t + C^i S_{j,t} + \eta_{i,t}$$

where  $r_{i,t}$  is the log difference in commodity price,  $f_t$  is the common factor and  $S_{j,t}$ ,  $j = 1, 2$  is the sector-specific factor, and  $\eta_{i,t}$  is the idiosyncratic component. Both the common factor and the sector-specific factors follow an AR(1) process. In order to identify the common factor as an aggregate demand factor, following the interpretation of [Alquist et al. \[2020\]](#), we impose the sign restriction that the factor loadings of the common factor,  $B^i \geq 0$ . Similarly, we interpret the food specific factor as the common demand factor for

the food sector. Along with identification restriction, we also need to impose a normalization restriction, in order to overcome the well-known problem of unidentified models resulting from rotational indeterminacies of factors and loadings. Following [Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman \[2008\]](#), we normalize the contemporaneous factor loading of the iron ore for the common factor, and the contemporaneous factor loading of poultry for the food factor, to unity.<sup>29</sup>

We cast the dynamic factor model in the state space form and estimate it using Bayesian methods using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). Two approaches have become popular for the estimation and identification of factor models: the analysis of principal components and Bayesian methods. Due to its simplicity and the availability of high speed computers, principal component analysis is extensively used for both static and dynamic factor models, extending to models using hundreds of series. As [Kose et al. \[2008\]](#) explain, principal component method is, however, not well suited for estimating models under exclusion restrictions. Model estimation using principal component requires deriving factors from the variance or spectrum of all series simultaneously, and therefore, it becomes inappropriate when a subset of variables is assumed to relate to the factors in a different manner than the rest of the variables. In other words, factors cannot be derived in one step. Therefore, we follow [Kose et al. \[2008\]](#) and use the Bayesian method which easily accommodates restrictions on how the factors affect subsets of series. The following paragraph outlines our estimation technique.

We need to use special techniques to estimate the model as the factors are unobservable. Following [Chatterjee \[2016\]](#), we apply the Bayesian posterior simulation method to estimate the dynamic latent factor model. The estimation procedure is based on the following vital observation: if the factors were observable, under a conjugate prior, the models would be a simple set of regressions with Gaussian autoregressive errors; that simple structure can, in turn, be used to determine the conditional normal distribution of the factors given the data and the parameters of the model. This conditional distribution can, then, easily be used to generate random samples, which can serve as proxy series for the unobserved factors. As the full set of conditional distribution is known – parameters given data and factors and factors given data and parameters – it is possible to generate samples from the joint posterior distribution for the unknown parameters and the unobserved factors using sequential sampling of the full set of conditional distributions in a Gibbs sampling. The process is iterated a large number of times. Under the regularity conditions satisfied here, the Markov chain so produced converges, and yields a sam-

---

<sup>29</sup>We have tried alternative normalizations of the food factor setting factor loadings for rice, or wheat or beef, to unity. The results are remarkably similar.

ple from the joint posterior distribution of the parameters and the unobserved factors, conditioned on the data.

Once we estimate the common demand factor and the food specific factor from the dynamic factor model, we residualize the log changes in global food price index to construct our food commodity shock that we used as an instrument.

## Appendix D Global Price Changes and Instrumental Variables




Figure A1: Oil and Food Price Shocks and the Respective Instrumental Variables

*Notes:* This figure plots the time series of oil (top panel) and food (bottom panel) price shocks and the respective IVs. The oil price shock series is the month-on-month change in log WTI crude oil prices; food price shock is the month-on-month change in log global food price index published by the IMF. The supply instrument for oil price shocks is taken from [Baumeister and Hamilton \[2019\]](#). The food supply instrument is constructed using a dynamic factor model as described in [Appendix C](#).

## Appendix E Details on Empirical Specifications

### E.1 List of Controls and IVs in Household Regressions

Table A5: Instrumental and Control Variables in Household Panel Local Projection

---

*Panel A. Instrumental Variables*

- Oil supply shock estimated in [Baumeister and Hamilton \[2019\]](#)
- Food supply shock estimated using a dynamic factor model of non-energy commodity prices

---

*Panel B. Control Variables*

- Lags of outcome variables
  - 3 lags
- Lags of global oil and food price changes
  - 3 lags
- State-by-time-fixed effects
  - State-by-calendar month-fixed effects
  - State-by-calendar year-fixed effects
- Socio economic status-fixed effects
  - Caste
  - Religion
  - Education groups
  - Big city
- Demographic controls
  - Age fixed effects for 5-year age bins over working life
- Aggregate world condition controls (interacted with household income group dummies)
  - World Industrial Production
  - US Federal Funds Rate
  - Change in global VIX
- Demonetization policy dummy

*Notes:* This table shows our instrumental variables and a set of control variables in our baseline panel household local projection regressions.

## E.2 First-Stage F-stats for Household IV Specifications

Table A6: F-statistics for Panel Local Projection IV Regressions of Household Consumption

	(1)	(2)
	Consumption	Non-durable Consumption
<i>Panel A : Global Food Price Shock &amp; Food Supply IV</i>		
First stage F-stats	5644.9	5684.6
<i>Panel B : Global Oil Price Shock &amp; Oil Supply IV</i>		
First stage F-stats	810.3	799.3

*Notes:* This table shows F-statistics from first-stage regressions for our panel IV local projection estimation of effects on household consumption (Column(1)) and non-durable consumption (Column (2)).

### E.3 Responses Relative to Group 2




Figure A2: Response of Non-Durable Consumption to External Oil and Food Price Shocks by Income Quintiles

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (3.1) where the external shock is log changes in global WTI oil and food prices. The IRFs are presented relative to the second (Income: Low) group. The external shocks are instrumented by global supply shocks. The dependent variable is log changes in households' non-durable consumption. The light blue region refers to the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68 % confidence interval.

## E.4 List of Controls and IVs in Regional Regressions

Table A7: Instrumental and Control Variables in Regional Panel Local Projection

---

*Panel A. Instrumental Variables*

- Oil supply shock estimated in [Baumeister and Hamilton \[2019\]](#)
- Food supply shock estimated using a dynamic factor model of non-energy commodity prices

---

*Panel B. Control Variables*

- Lags of outcome variables
  - 1 lag
- Lags of global oil and food price changes
  - 1 lag
- State-fixed effects
- Time-fixed effects
  - Calendar month
  - Calendar year
- Aggregate world condition controls
  - World Industrial Production
  - US federal funds rate
  - Change in global VIX
- Demonetization policy dummy

---

*Notes:* This table shows our instrumental variables and a set of control variables in our baseline panel regional local projection regressions.

## E.5 First-Stage F-stats for Regional IV Specifications

Table A8: F-statistics for Panel Local Projection IV Regressions of State-Geography Level Prices

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	CPI (All)	CPI (Food)	CPI (Fuel)
<i>Panel A : Global Food Price Shock &amp; Food Supply IV</i>			
<b>First stage F-stats</b>	3,635.9	3,614.5	2,384.9
<i>Panel B : Global Oil Price Shock &amp; Oil Supply IV</i>			
<b>First stage F-stats</b>	1410.0	1,515.7	666.2

*Notes:* This table shows F-statistics from first-stage regressions for our panel IV local projection estimation of effects on regional prices. Columns (1) through (3) show the F-statistics for estimation of effect on CPI (headline), CPI (Food), and CPI (Fuel) respectively.

## E.6 OLS Results on Regional Price Effects of External Shocks




Figure A3: Response of State Level Prices to External Oil and Food Price Shocks (OLS)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (4.8) where external shock is log changes in global oil price in the top panel and log changes in global food price in the bottom panel. These are OLS estimates. The dependent variable is log changes in state level prices. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68% confidence interval.

## Appendix F Additional Results

### F.1 OLS and IV Comparison for Food Price Shocks




Figure A4: Response of Consumption and Earnings to External Food Price Shocks by Income Quintiles

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (3.1) where the external shock is log changes in global food price. In the IV version, the log changes in global food price is instrumented by a global supply shock. The dependent variable is log changes in household consumption, non-durable consumption, and labor earnings. The light blue region refers to the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68 % confidence interval.

## F.2 Expenditure Switching of Non-durables




Figure A5: Response of Non-durable to Total Price Ratio and Non-durable Consumption Share to External Oil and Food Price Shocks (IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (3.1) where external shock is log changes in global food price (top panel), which is instrumented by a global food supply shock and log changes in global oil price (bottom panel), which is instrumented by a global oil supply shock. The dependent variable is non-durable consumption share in total expenditures. The left column plots the response of non-durable price to overall price.

### E.3 Discussion Results




Figure A6: Summary Statistics of Response of Earnings and Non-durable Consumption to Food and Fuel Price Shocks by Income Quintiles (IV)

*Notes:* This figure is a box and whisker plot that summarizes the responses of labor earnings and non-durable consumption to the two external shocks that is presented in Figures 2, 3, and 5. The line in the center of each box represents the median impulse response estimate across thirteen horizons; the top and the bottom edges of each box represent the 75<sup>th</sup> and the 25<sup>th</sup> percentiles respectively; and the lines above and below each box represent respectively the upper and lower adjacent values calculated as in Tukey et al. [1977].




Figure A7: Response of Short Term Interest Rate Spread and Stock Prices to Food and Fuel Price Shocks (IV)

Notes: This figures is the impulse response estimated on the basis of a time series local projection framework.

In Figure A7, in the left columns, we use monthly time series data on short-run (3 month) interest rate spread (relative to the U.S.) as the dependent variable,  $Y$ , and Indian industrial production and CPI as well as dummies for global financial crisis, taper tantrum and demonetization as controls,  $X$ , in a local projection framework:

$$Y_{t+h} - Y_{t-1} = c + \sum_{j=1}^J \alpha_j^h (Y_{t-j}) + \sum_{k=0}^K \beta_k^h ext_{t-k} + \gamma_h X_t + \epsilon_{t+h}.$$

Here,  $ext$  is our measure of global food and oil price changes instrumented by the corresponding supply shocks, and  $J = 3; K = 3$ . In the right two columns, our dependent variables are month-to-month changes in the Indian stock price index, Nifty 50, and the estimated impulse responses are cumulative. Our monthly time series data is obtained from Datastream and CEIC, and covers the period January, 2000 to March, 2018.

Table A9: Impact of Global Food and Oil Price on Branch Level Lending Rate (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Lending Rate (t)	Lending Rate (t)	Lending Rate (t+1)	Lending Rate (t+1)
Global Food Price Change	0.019*** (0.0001)		0.026*** (0.0001)	
Global Oil Price Change		0.009*** (0.0000)		0.016*** (0.0001)
Lending Rate (t-1)	0.540*** (0.0023)	0.536*** (0.0023)	0.309*** (0.0022)	0.307*** (0.0022)
Observations	1,161,401	1,161,401	1,014,277	1,014,277
R-squared	0.34	0.33	0.17	0.10
Bank FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

For the estimates reported in Table A9, we use the administrative lending rate data at bank-branch level obtained from the Basic Statistical Returns reported to the Reserve Bank of India. Because the data is annual (1998-2016), we need to aggregate our monthly global price changes to the annual level. Because of the short time series, we use a dynamic panel regression to estimate the impact of global price rises on lending rates contemporaneously and one period ahead (instead of a local projection to estimate the entire horizon of dynamic effects as impulse response functions). Our regression specification is:

$$lr_{b,t+1} = c + \alpha(lr_{b,t-1}) + \beta ext_t + \gamma X_t + \delta_{bank} + \delta_{district}^* + \epsilon_{t+h}$$

As before,  $ext$  is our measure of global food and oil price changes instrumented by the corresponding supply shocks and the standard errors are clustered at the district level.




Figure A8: Summary Statistics of Response of Total and Non-durable Consumption to Food and Fuel Price Shocks by Income Quintiles (IV)

*Notes:* This figure is a box and whisker plot that summarizes the responses of total and non-durable consumption to the two external shocks that is presented in Figures 2 and 3. The line in the center of each box represents the median impulse response estimate across thirteen horizons; the top and the bottom edges of each box represent the 75<sup>th</sup> and the 25<sup>th</sup> percentiles respectively; and the lines above and below each box represent respectively the upper and lower adjacent values calculated as in [Tukey et al. \[1977\]](#).

Table A10: Share of Formal and Informal Occupations by Income Groups (in %)

Income Groups	Share of Formal Occupation	Share of Informal Occupation
Lowest	34	66
Low	24	76
Low middle	32	68
Upper middle	46	54
High	75	25

*Notes:* This table presents the average share of formal and informal occupations among people in labor force for corresponding income groups. Informal occupations include agricultural laborers, home-based worker, small farmer, small trader/ hawker/ businessman without fixed premises, self employed entrepreneurs, legislator/ social workers/ activists and wage laborer. Formal occupations include businessman, industrial workers, managers, non-industrial technical employee, organised farmer, qualified self employed professionals, support staff, white collar clerical employees and White-Collar Professional Employees and Other Employees. The share is calculated on the basis of people who report occupations. While for the top four income groups roughly 8 % do not report an occupation, in the lowest income group, nearly 40 % do not report an occupation.

## F.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Groups based on per capita household income

Table A11: Summary Statistics by Income Decile (Based on Per Capita Household Income)

	No. of Hhs	Income		Consumption		Non-durable Share	Food Share
		Household	Per Capita	Household	Per Capita	Household	Household
1st Decile	43,223.65	728.16	111.33	1,413.53	274.08	0.78	0.62
2nd Decile	6,959.47	5,596.87	916.17	4,888.35	855.09	0.78	0.64
3rd Decile	8,060.78	6,453.36	1,148.40	5,138.74	966.81	0.78	0.63
4th Decile	9,017.66	7,319.30	1,373.23	5,400.72	1,068.39	0.77	0.62
5th Decile	10,436.45	8,173.62	1,621.02	5,646.06	1,183.47	0.77	0.61
6th Decile	12,116.28	9,287.45	1,923.05	5,950.28	1,304.91	0.76	0.60
7th Decile	13,258.50	10,657.55	2,315.70	6,255.31	1,445.09	0.75	0.59
8th Decile	14,910.67	12,704.20	2,869.67	6,713.44	1,619.70	0.75	0.58
9th Decile	18,170.81	16,230.00	3,852.63	7,367.53	1,885.03	0.74	0.56
10th Decile	29,823.33	28,500.95	8,177.00	8,928.43	2,665.15	0.72	0.52

*Notes:* This table presents some summary statistics by income deciles, where the deciles were calculated based on per-capita household income. Income and consumption are in real terms where they are deflated by the CPI (all, 2012=100) Non-durable and food share refer to consumption shares of non-durable and food consumption.




Figure A9: Summary Statistics of Response of Non-durable Consumption to Food and Fuel Price Shocks by Per Capita Income Quintiles (IV)

*Notes:* This figure is a box and whisker plot that summarizes the responses of non-durable consumption to the two external shocks when households are grouped on the basis of real per capita income in 2014. The line in the center of each box represents the median impulse response estimate across thirteen horizons; the top and the bottom edges of each box represent the 75<sup>th</sup> and the 25<sup>th</sup> percentiles respectively; and the lines above and below each box represent respectively the upper and lower adjacent values calculated as in [Tukey et al. \[1977\]](#).

## F.5 Sensitivity Analysis: Restricting the income transition matrix

Table A12: Transition Matrix of Real Income

	Q <sub>1</sub>	Q <sub>2</sub>	Q <sub>3</sub>	Q <sub>4</sub>	Q <sub>5</sub>	Total
Q <sub>1</sub>	80.98	4.15	4.40	6.16	4.31	100.00
Q <sub>2</sub>	7.26	76.07	13.70	2.21	0.75	100.00
Q <sub>3</sub>	4.17	6.35	80.13	8.60	0.75	100.00
Q <sub>4</sub>	4.89	0.89	6.87	83.71	3.65	100.00
Q <sub>5</sub>	7.70	0.76	1.59	8.15	81.80	100.00

*Notes:* This table presents the average transition probabilities (in % terms) between different income groups in our sample.




Figure A10: Summary Statistics of Response of Non-durable Consumption to Food and Fuel Price Shocks by Income Quintiles with restricted transition matrix(IV)

*Notes:* This figure is a box and whisker plot that summarizes the responses of non-durable consumption to the two external shocks while restricting the income transition matrix. The line in the center of each box represents the median impulse response estimate across thirteen horizons; the top and the bottom edges of each box represent the 75<sup>th</sup> and the 25<sup>th</sup> percentiles respectively; and the lines above and below each box represent respectively the upper and lower adjacent values calculated as in [Tukey et al. \[1977\]](#).

## F.6 Rural Urban Comparison




Figure A11: Response of Consumption to External Food Price Shocks by Income Quintiles (IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (5.1) where external shock is log changes in global food price, which is instrumented by a global food supply shock and the dependent variable is log changes in household consumption. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68% confidence interval.




Figure A12: Response of Consumption to External Oil Price Shocks by Income Quintiles (IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (5.1) where external shock is log changes in global oil price, which is instrumented by a global oil supply shock and the dependent variable is log changes in household consumption. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68% confidence interval.




Figure A13: Response of Earnings to External Food and Oil Price Shocks by Income Quintiles (IV)

Notes: Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (5.1) where external shock is log changes in global food price, which is instrumented by a global food supply shock, and log changes in global oil price, which is instruments by a global oil supply shock. The dependent variable is log changes in household labor earnings. The light blue region is the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68 % confidence interval.

## F.7 Effects on Regional Inequality

Here we present IV results regarding effects of global price shocks on regional inequality where we instrument the changes in global food and oil prices. These IV results will isolate variation coming from supply shocks to global food and oil prices as we discussed previously. The specification is given in equation (5.2). We report cumulative impulse responses below. Table A13 lists our control and instrumental variables.

Figures A14 and A15 present answers to the key question of this section based on equation (5.2): How does regional consumption inequality evolve dynamically in response to external food and oil price changes? Broadly speaking, in Figure A14, we observe that an increase in global food prices increases consumption inequality within a state over time, with effects on both total and non-durable consumption inequality statistically significant and persistent.

In Figure A15, we see that an increase in global oil prices does not have as clear of an effect on consumption inequality. In fact, consumption inequality for most of these measures

Table A13: Instrumental and Control Variables in Regional Panel Local Projection

---

*Panel A. Instrumental Variables*

- Oil supply shock estimated in [Baumeister and Hamilton \[2019\]](#)
- Food supply shock estimated using a dynamic factor model of food commodity prices

---

*Panel B. Control Variables*

- Lags of outcome variables
  - 1 lag
- Lags of global oil and food price changes
  - 1 lag
- State-fixed effects
- Time-fixed effects
  - Calendar month
  - Calendar year
- Aggregate world condition controls
  - World Industrial Production
  - US federal funds rate
  - Change in global VIX
- Demonetization policy dummy

---

*Notes:* This table shows our instrumental variables and a set of control variables in our baseline panel regional local projection regressions.

seems to decrease over time. The effects of oil shocks on regional inequality hence appear to be more nuanced, consistent with what we uncover from detailed household level data.




Figure A14: Response of Regional Consumption Inequality to External Food Price Shocks (IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (5.2) where external shock is log changes in global food price, which is instrumented by a global food supply shock and the dependent variable is log changes in inequality. The light blue region refers to the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68 % confidence interval.




Figure A15: Response of Regional Consumption Inequality to External Oil Price Shocks (IV)

*Notes:* Cumulative IRFs on the basis of equation (5.2) where external shock is log changes in global oil price, which is instrumented by a global oil supply shock and the dependent variable is log changes in inequality. The light blue region refers to the 90% confidence interval and the dark blue region is the 68 % confidence interval.

# PROTECTIONISM IN A GREEN SUIT? MARKET POWER IN CARBON-BASED TRADE POLICY

**Sankalp Mathur**

December 29, 2023

Carbon tariffs have received widespread support as a second-best policy tool to regulate foreign emissions indirectly. In this paper, I document novel evidence suggesting that carbon-intensive sectors have higher market power and thus charge higher markups. Thus, carbon tariffs lead to sizable profit-shifting across countries. I build a multi-industry structural model of international trade with input-output linkages to analyze the welfare implications of a carbon-based trade policy reform. I study the nature of profit shifting in response to the carbon-embodied tariffs and quantify the aggregate and distributional effects on welfare and emissions. The findings suggest that accounting for market power increases the effectiveness of trade policy in reducing global emissions. However, it generates heterogeneous effects across countries where countries may lose as high as four percentage points or gain more after accounting for profits with the counterfactual trade policy reform. India, for example, experiences a welfare gain of 0.34 percentage points.

**JEL Codes:** F18, F12, F14, Q50, Q56, H23, F13

**Keywords:** Carbon tariffs, climate change, Profit shifting, imperfect competition, markups, market power, gains from trade, environmental bias

---

<sup>1</sup>Current Affiliation: CAFRAL, Reserve Bank of India. Email. [sankalpmathur@cafral.org.in](mailto:sankalpmathur@cafral.org.in). Website [www.sankalpmathur.com](http://www.sankalpmathur.com)